xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support
To: |
"Cihula, Joseph" <joseph.cihula@xxxxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <xense-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
Subject: |
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support |
From: |
Keir Fraser <Keir.Fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxx> |
Date: |
Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:04:56 +0000 |
Cc: |
"Xu, James" <james.xu@xxxxxxxxx>, "Wang, Shane" <shane.wang@xxxxxxxxx>, "Wei, Gang" <gang.wei@xxxxxxxxx> |
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Mon, 29 Oct 2007 11:05:51 -0700 |
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[Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support |
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On 29/10/07 18:00, "Cihula, Joseph" <joseph.cihula@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> By low memory, do you mean the signature is in the bottom megabyte of
>> memory? If that's guaranteed then can we just scan the whole lot
>> 0x00000-0xfffff (excluding VGA hole)?
>
> Yes, it's in the lower 1MB and that is where dom0 has problems with
> gaps. But I think that the UNUSABLE->RESERVED approach will be just as
> effective and reduce the amount of memory to scan as well.
Okay, we should limit the scan to page-aligned addresses in UNUSABLE regions
below 1MB. It makes sense to put the UNUSABLE->RESERVED hack in Xen itself,
rather than in tboot. Once the interface is baked into 3.2.0 it's not
changing on our side.
-- Keir
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- [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, (continued)
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- [Xense-devel] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support,
Keir Fraser <=
- RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- RE: [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted ExecutionTechnology support, Cihula, Joseph
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