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xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - VT-d (PCI passthro
>>> On 12.05.11 at 15:48, Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Intel VT-d chipsets without interrupt remapping do not prevent a guest
> which owns a PCI device from using DMA to generate MSI interrupts by
> writing to the interrupt injection registers. This can be exploited
> to inject traps and gain control of the host.
Isn't that (or at least can't that be) prevented with DMA remapping?
> The first patch is intended to reduce the impact from full privilege
> escalation to denial of service.
> Filename: 00-block-msis-on-trap-vectors
> SHA1: 0fcc1914714c228e98b3e84597e06cb5de09003c
> SHA256: 998e8d5632ee6ad92f52796fe94923f9c38096c5adf2ca74209a6792436ea1e9
You modify only 64-bit and only VT-d code here. While I know you
don't care much for it, doing the same for 32-bit would seem trivial.
As to AMD's IOMMU, it may well be that interrupt re-mapping isn't
optional in the hardware (albeit it can be disabled on the command
line, though that's the admin's security risk then), but the code
having BUG_ON()s on failed allocations and those allocations
happening in table parsing callbacks doesn't really make this
explicit (for me at least) on the first glance.
Finally, wouldn't killing all guests that potentially could have caused
the problem be a better measure than bringing down the host?
Jan
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