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xen-devel
Re: Fw: [Xen-devel] Xen on /. again
> Information about other domains' memory usage is leaked via the
> hardware->physical mapping.
OK, I was forgetting about the domain memory reservation hypercalls. It's
probably reasonable just to throw away ballooning functionality where this
might be a problem.
The main problem (as I see it) is going to be the network interface, whose
performance depends on page-flipping. You can eliminate the security problem
without hiding machine address if you copy incoming packets but that's going
to hurt performance :-(
> > Timing related attacks are somewhat trickier to eliminate covert channels
> > in, although some randomisation can limit the bandwidth.
>
> Eliminating covert channels is completely infeasible. I don't see any
> value in aiming for this. It's not a useful security property in most
> circumstances.
I agree it's not useful in the majority of circumstances. If it's required it
can be implemented at a later date but the returns for the amount of time
invested are likely to be smaller.
Cheers,
Mark
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