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xen-devel
[Xen-devel] RE: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux
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To: |
Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx>, Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xxxxxxxx> |
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Subject: |
[Xen-devel] RE: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux |
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From: |
Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@xxxxxxxxxx> |
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Date: |
Thu, 2 Jul 2009 07:03:46 -0700 (PDT) |
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Cc: |
npiggin@xxxxxxx, akpm@xxxxxxxx, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, tmem-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, alan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx, kurt.hackel@xxxxxxxxxx, Rusty Russell <rusty@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, dave.mccracken@xxxxxxxxxx, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>, Himanshu Raj <rhim@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, sunil.mushran@xxxxxxxxxx, Avi Kivity <avi@xxxxxxxxxx>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@xxxxxxxxxx>, Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, chris.mason@xxxxxxxxxx, Balbir Singh <balbir@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
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Mon, 06 Jul 2009 08:08:14 -0700 |
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OK, OK, I give up. I will ensure all code for shared pools
is removed from the next version of the patch.
Though for future reference, I am interested in what
problems it has other than "just" security (offlist
if you want).
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Pavel Machek [mailto:pavel@xxxxxx]
>
> > > Yeah, a shared namespace of accessible objects is an entirely
> > > new thing
> > > in the Xen universe. I would also drop Xen support until
> > > there's a good
> > > security story about how they can be used.
> >
> > While I agree that the security is not bulletproof, I wonder
> > if this position might be a bit extreme. Certainly, the NSA
> > should not turn on tmem in a cluster, but that doesn't mean that
> > nobody should be allowed to. I really suspect that there are
>
> This has more problems than "just" security, and yes, security should
> be really solved at design time...
>
> Pavel
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