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xen-devel
[Xen-devel] Re: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux
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To: |
Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@xxxxxxxxxx> |
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Subject: |
[Xen-devel] Re: [RFC] transcendent memory for Linux |
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From: |
Pavel Machek <pavel@xxxxxx> |
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Date: |
Thu, 2 Jul 2009 08:38:13 +0200 |
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Cc: |
npiggin@xxxxxxx, akpm@xxxxxxxx, Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, tmem-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, alan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-mm@xxxxxxxxx, kurt.hackel@xxxxxxxxxx, Rusty Russell <rusty@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, dave.mccracken@xxxxxxxxxx, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>, Himanshu Raj <rhim@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, sunil.mushran@xxxxxxxxxx, Avi Kivity <avi@xxxxxxxxxx>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@xxxxxxxxxx>, Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, chris.mason@xxxxxxxxxx, Balbir Singh <balbir@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
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Mon, 06 Jul 2009 08:07:33 -0700 |
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Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) |
> > Yeah, a shared namespace of accessible objects is an entirely
> > new thing
> > in the Xen universe. I would also drop Xen support until
> > there's a good
> > security story about how they can be used.
>
> While I agree that the security is not bulletproof, I wonder
> if this position might be a bit extreme. Certainly, the NSA
> should not turn on tmem in a cluster, but that doesn't mean that
> nobody should be allowed to. I really suspect that there are
This has more problems than "just" security, and yes, security should
be really solved at design time...
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures)
http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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