[Xen-devel] [PATCH] vtd: do FLR before xc.domain_destroy()

To:	"Keir Fraser" <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject:	[Xen-devel] [PATCH] vtd: do FLR before xc.domain_destroy()
From:	"Cui, Dexuan" <dexuan.cui@xxxxxxxxx>
Date:	Tue, 26 Aug 2008 20:46:45 +0800
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Delivery-date:	Tue, 26 Aug 2008 05:47:12 -0700
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Thread-topic:	[PATCH] vtd: do FLR before xc.domain_destroy()

When we "xm destroy" a guest with assigned devices, in
xen/common/domain.c:domain_kill(), we relinquish guest's memory first,
then invoke domain_destroy() -> complete_domain_destroy() ->
arch_domain_destroy() -> pci_release_devices()/iommu_domain_destroy().
 
Between relinquish_memory() and domain_destroy(), a device may be
issuing DMA request and access guest's relinquished  memory.
 
We can do_FLR() to quiesce devices before xc.domain_destroy().
 
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <dexuan.cui@xxxxxxxxx>

fix_panic_wb.patch
Description: fix_panic_wb.patch

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[Xen-devel] [PATCH] vtd: do FLR before xc.domain_destroy()