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xen-devel
[Xen-devel] possible pciback security issue
Having looked more closely into what would be needed to enable MSI support I
stumbled across a simple question: If a
domU is granted access to an MSI-capable device, it could maliciously or
erroneously enable MSI on that device and
program an arbitrary vector to be delivered, or even force the message address
and/or value to something that might make
the system misbehave/crash.
It would seem to me that filtering only a few header fields is insufficient
from a security point of view, not only
from the perspective of MSI. While this may severely limit functionality, I
think by default only read access must be
granted to any fields/bits of unknown meaning (namely everything outside the
header).
Jan
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