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xen-devel
Re: Fw: [Xen-devel] Xen on /. again
Trent Jaeger wrote:
- isolation boundaries cost more than you might think, but computers are
a lot faster now (10X+)
- we need mandatory access control interface like LSM to have flexible
control of resources (rather than dump resources to a control partition)
- authorize access at bind time rather than at use time (no critical
path impact)
Is there any reason to allow communication between VMs, other than
driver access? It seems to me you can just use network communication
(potentially signed or encrypted) when you need to communicate, and that
anything else would violate the fundamental 'virtual machine' abstraction?
Also, I suppose you will wish to prevent covert channels between
domains, e.g. domains communicating using various timing attacks (I move
the disk head to the other end of the disk if I wish to tell you
something), or by allocating/freeing certains parts of memory.
How much will you need to dumb down the VMs view of what is going on in
the machine to achieve this (not expose real time information, not
expose real page tables), and how much of a VMM will there be left when
you are done?
best regards,
Jacob
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