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RE: [Xense-devel] Shype/ACM for HVM guest.

To: "Praveen Kushwaha" <praveen.kushwaha@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: RE: [Xense-devel] Shype/ACM for HVM guest.
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2007 10:59:11 -0400
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"Praveen Kushwaha" <praveen.kushwaha@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote on 04/03/2007 05:42:56 AM:

> Hi,

>              Yes that is fine if the paravirtualized drivers are
> used in HVM then we can put hooks on that. But it is different case,
> how actually shype/ACM works in case of VMExit/VMEntry.

>               Since in case of VMExit/VMEntry there are no
> hypercalls, then how sHype/ACM implements security.

>               I mean to ask that how sHype/ACM works in case of HVM guest.

In case of an HVM guest you would have the Chinese Wall Policy hooks checking whether the HVM guest is allowed to run with its current VM label.
Access to resources such as image files is also checked when a virtual machine is started up.


> Thanks,
> Praveen Kushwaha
> From: Stefan Berger [mailto:stefanb@xxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, April 02, 2007 7:19 PM
> To: Praveen Kushwaha
> Cc: xense-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; xense-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [Xense-devel] Shype/ACM for HVM guest.

> xense-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote on 04/02/2007 05:40:39 AM:
> > Hi,
> >             Does Shype/ACM architecture for implementing security in
> > xen supports HVM guest also?  I mean to say that, as per my
> HVM guests are supported in so far that the configuration of an HVM
> is checked when the VM is started. This is done in xend where
> resource assignments (disk access)  are validated.
> > knowledge in xen 3.0.4         shype/ACM is implemented. Does this
> > shype/ACM work also for the HVM (windows) guest?
> >               As per my understanding shype/ACM puts hook on
> > hypercalls from the hypervisor, and consult with the ACM. But in
> > case of full virtualization, hypervisor does not have hypercalls to
> > communicate with HVM guest. There is VMEntry/VMExit for
> This is correct. Though, if paravirtualized drivers are used in an
> HVM, also they will need to go through the hooks for grant table
> access and event channels.
>    Stefan
> > communication, in which guest state and host state are saved.  Since
> > there are no hypercalls  in case of full virtualization then how the
> > actually shype/ACM works. Where does it put hooks? Or is there any
> > other mechanism through which it implements security in HVM guest.
> >       If any one has information regarding it  please reply.
> >  
> > Thanks,
> > Praveen Kushwaha
> >  
> >        
> >  
> >  _______________________________________________
> > Xense-devel mailing list
> > Xense-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://lists.xensource.com/xense-devel
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