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xen-users
RE: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> Gregory Gee
> Sent: 04 October 2006 14:20
> To: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [Xen-users] AMD's VT for chipsets
>
> Thorolf Godawa wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> >> I'm not sure if it's part of the translation or some other sort of
> >> misunderstanding, but chipsets (non-processor components) are not
> >> necessary for the AMD-V technology (formerly Pacifica) to operate
> > I think he means s.th. related to the problem of the
> virtualisation of
> > the i/o that the AMD-CPUs should do better than the first
> > Intel-implementation of VT.
> >
> > AMD calls this "AMD I/O Virtualization Technology (IOMMU)
> > Specification", you find a PDF here:
> >
> http://www.amd.com/us-en/assets/content_type/white_papers_and_
> tech_docs/34434.pdf
> >
> >
> > The "Intel Virtualization Technology for Directed I/O
> (VTd)" should be
> > implemented in a later version of Intel-VT (see PDF:
> >
> ftp://download.intel.com/technology/computing/vptech/Intel(r)_
> VT_for_Direct_IO.pdf
> > ).
> >
> > But actually I don't know the status of this technique too and if
> > there are really advantages for the user right now!
>
> Wouldn't this allow PCI pass-through for SVM which isn't possible
> today? I find PCI pas-through really useful but I can't use it for
> Windows guest in SVM.
Yes, that and better security are the two key points of this type of
technology.
The problem with PCI pass-through is that the fully-virtualized OS
doesn't know the machine physical address, so when it tries to tell the
PCI device that it's got some data to work on, it gives the guest
physical address - which is most likely NOT the machine physical
address. IOMMU allows the mapping of DMA-memory from guest-physical
address to machine-physical address.
Since we can allow and disallow individual pages to be target to
PCI-devices (or any other IO-devices), it allows for better security in
the system, since a device that has a bug or security hole will still be
prevented from reading/writing addresses that aren't specifically
indicated as "allowed". Just like the MMU inside the CPU allows the
application to access some pieces of memory, whilst others are not
allowed to be accessed.
--
Mats
>
> Greg
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-users mailing list
> Xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://lists.xensource.com/xen-users
>
>
>
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