Thank you to all who've commented on this thread.
Take care,
Sina
-----Original Message-----
From: xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Christopher Head
Sent: Friday, December 12, 2008 5:41 AM
To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Implementing split memory in Xen is annoyingly
hard?
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Sina Bahram wrote:
[snip]
> One potential work around:
>
> I could mark every single page of the guest's kernel as NX, and then when
> that fault happens, I could then be privy to all executes from within Xen.
[snip]
I can see three possible arrangements you might try: (1) leave the data
mapped normally and handle execution specially, (2) leave code mapped
normally and handle data specially, or (3) leave neither one mapped
normally and handle both specially. As far as I can tell, solution 2
wouldn't work at all, solution 1 has a chance of working, and solution 3
is rather pointless if either of the other two works.
I don't think it would work to leave code mapped normally and map data
specially, because execute permission implies read permission and hence
you cannot make a page executable without making it also readable.
HOWEVER, I think #1 could work. The page is normally set as readable,
writable, and not executable. When the guest attempts to execute the
page, a fault occurs. Taking a cue from the PaX patches, we observe that
there are two separate TLBs: one for code and one for data. If we can
"prime" the code TLB with the proper execution mapping and then change
the page table back to the regular data mapping, we'll be in business.
In PaX, it's the data TLB that gets primed, which is trivially easy:
just touch the page. Priming the code TLB looks rather more difficult,
since you clearly have to execute something on that page in order to do
so. However, you don't want to execute arbitrary guest code, because you
need to be able to remap the page table back to the data page after
priming the TLB!
The only way I can think of to do this is to set up the mapping as code
and then stuff a specially-chosen faulting instruction into the code
page, saving what was previously there. Return to the guest with
interrupts disabled (so there's no way for control to transfer anywhere
except the jump target). The guest sees the page table set for the code
page, loads the code TLB, and then immediately hits the faulting
instruction. The hypervisor takes over, changes the pagetable mapping
back to the data page, replaces the faulting instruction with what was
originally there, and lets the guest carry on. The code TLB now having
been primed, no additional page faults occur; further, since the
pagetable has been reset, any data accesses will load the data TLB with
the data page mapping.
This sounds really intrusive though.
Chris
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