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Re: [Xen-devel] possible pciback security issue

>>> Keir Fraser <Keir.Fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxx> 04.05.06 15:06 >>>
>On 4 May 2006, at 13:57, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> Having looked more closely into what would be needed to enable MSI 
>> support I stumbled across a simple question: If a
>> domU is granted access to an MSI-capable device, it could maliciously 
>> or erroneously enable MSI on that device and
>> program an arbitrary vector to be delivered, or even force the message 
>> address and/or value to something that might make
>> the system misbehave/crash.
>> It would seem to me that filtering only a few header fields is 
>> insufficient from a security point of view, not only
>> from the perspective of MSI. While this may severely limit 
>> functionality, I think by default only read access must be
>> granted to any fields/bits of unknown meaning (namely everything 
>> outside the header).
>That *is* the default.

Oh, sorry, I missed the permissive flag.


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