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    |   xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] possible pciback security issue 
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On 4 May 2006, at 13:57, Jan Beulich wrote:
 Having looked more closely into what would be needed to enable MSI 
support I stumbled across a simple question: If a
domU is granted access to an MSI-capable device, it could maliciously 
or erroneously enable MSI on that device and
program an arbitrary vector to be delivered, or even force the message 
address and/or value to something that might make
the system misbehave/crash.
It would seem to me that filtering only a few header fields is 
insufficient from a security point of view, not only
from the perspective of MSI. While this may severely limit 
functionality, I think by default only read access must be
granted to any fields/bits of unknown meaning (namely everything 
outside the header). 
That *is* the default.
 -- Keir
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