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Re: [Xen-devel] yanked share, round 2

To: "King, Steven R" <steven.r.king@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] yanked share, round 2
From: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2006 15:31:59 -0600
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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King, Steven R wrote:

I would like hear your ideas for who manages the pool and how the pool
avoids becoming depleted.
I won't take credit for this as it is Rusty's idea actually :-)

Depletion can be handled by setting a maximum amount of shared memory per-domain (2MB for instance). Then as long as there is enough free memory to satisfy the per-domain sharing requirement, you're fine.

The memory can be allocated straight from the xen heap and referenced counted such that it is returned back to the heap when the last user stops sharing it. The 2MB limit would be somewhat virtual since the same page would be factored into every domain's actual limit who had a reference to the page.

This is my understand at least, perhaps Rusty can clarify with what he was thinking.

In addition to avoiding the ownership problem, I see another nice
advantage:
The third party (Xen? a DomP?) can hand up to the DomU's a nice tidy key
value representing the shared pages, which is very similar to the way
SysV IPC memory sharing works.
Precisely :-)

Regards,

Anthony Liguori

-steve

-----Original Message-----
From: Anthony Liguori [mailto:aliguori@xxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 11:35 AM
To: King, Steven R
Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] yanked share, round 2

You avoid zombies and either side can break the sharing without causing
harm to the other side.  Domains restarting are transparent to either
end (the restarting domain just reattachs and keeps going).  It avoids
the general ownership problem altogether.

Regards,

Anthony Liguori

King, Steven R wrote:

Hi Anthony -- Can you explain why this is ideal?  I prefer that sharers

and mappers have their own skin the game--that way, Xen doesn't have to

manage a pool and nobody has to worry about the pool being depleted.

-----Original Message-----
From: Anthony Liguori [mailto:aliguori@xxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 11:23 AM
To: King, Steven R
Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] yanked share, round 2

An ideal solution to this problem would be to keep a separate pool of shared memory that neither domain owned. That removes any concerns about ownership.

Regards,

Anthony Liguori

King, Steven R wrote:



Hi folks,
A previous thread discussed complications around DomU's sharing memory


pages with each other:
http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-devel/2005-12/msg00499.ht
ml

To summarize, DomU's get into trouble, e.g. unable to shutdown, unless


the remote DomU's play nice. Since DomU's do not trust each other, that is problematic. I'd like to discuss how to clean away this dependency.

Here's one idea. The goal is to robustly decouple the sharing and remote domains.

Grant tables add a new GTF_safe flag, settable by the sharing DomU.
In order to map a GTF_safe page, a remote domain must provide a page of its own, which I'll call an "under page". Xen holds the under-page on behalf of the remote DomU and maps the shared page into the remote DomU's machine. At any time, the sharing DomU can unshare the page, crash, etc, which ends ALL foreign access to that page, not just new mappings.
For each remote domain that still maps the unshared page, Xen maps the


remote's under-page in place of the unshared page.
The remote domain can unmap at any time and recover its under-page.

The purpose of the under-page is to plug the memory hole in the remote


DomU created by a surprise unsharing. A nervous remote DomU could check that a share is GTF_safe before proceeding to map the page.

Good, bad or ugly?
-steve




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