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Re: [PATCH v4 12/16] xen: implement new foreign copy hypercall


  • To: Frediano Ziglio <freddy77@xxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 16:59:35 +0200
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  • Cc: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@xxxxxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:59:44 +0000
  • Feedback-id: default:8631fc262581453bbf619ec5b2062170:Sweego
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

Le 03/06/2026 à 15:08, Frediano Ziglio a écrit :
From: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@xxxxxxxxxx>

Add a sub hypercall to __HYPERVISOR_memory_op to allow to
read/write memory from/to a foreign domain.

Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
  xen/common/memory.c         | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  xen/include/public/memory.h |  40 ++++++++++-
  2 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
index 3672bda025..6a2d9c3190 100644
--- a/xen/common/memory.c
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c
@@ -1545,6 +1545,132 @@ static int acquire_resource(
      return rc;
  }
+/*
+ * The "noinline" qualifier avoid the compiler to create a large function
+ * consuming quite a lot of stack.
+ */
+static int noinline mem_foreigncopy(
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_foreigncopy_t) arg)
+{
+    struct domain *d, *const currd = current->domain;
+    xen_foreigncopy_t copy;
+    int rc, direction;
+
+    if ( !arch_acquire_resource_check(currd) )
+        return -EACCES;
+
+    if ( copy_from_guest(&copy, arg, 1) )
+        return -EFAULT;
+
+    if ( copy.flags & ~1u )
+        return -EINVAL;
+
+    direction = copy.flags & XENMEM_foreigncopy_direction;
+
+    if ( copy.nr_frames == 0 )
+        return 0;
+
+    rc = rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(copy.domid, &d);
+    if ( rc )
+        return rc;
+
+    /*
+     * Check we are allowed to map and access these foreign pages.
+     */
+    rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, currd, d);
+    if ( rc )
+        goto out;
+
+    do {
+        /*
+         * Arbitrary size.  Not too much stack space, and a reasonable stride
+         * for continuation checks.
+         */
+        xen_pfn_t gfn_list[32];
+        unsigned int todo = MIN(ARRAY_SIZE(gfn_list), copy.nr_frames);
+
+        rc = -EFAULT;
+        if ( copy_from_guest(gfn_list, copy.frame_list, todo) )
+            goto out;
+
+        for ( unsigned i = 0; i < todo; i++ )
+        {
+            struct page_info *foreign_page;
+            void *foreign;
+            p2m_type_t p2mt;
+
+            foreign_page = get_page_from_gfn(d, gfn_list[i], &p2mt, P2M_ALLOC);
+
+            if ( unlikely(p2mt != p2m_ram_rw
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+                 && p2mt != p2m_ram_logdirty
+#endif
+                 ) && foreign_page )
+            {
+                put_page(foreign_page);
+                foreign_page = NULL;
+            }
+            if ( unlikely(!foreign_page) )
+            {
+                gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+                         "Error accessing foreign mfn %" PRI_mfn "\n",
+                         gfn_list[i]);
+                rc = -EINVAL;
+                copy.nr_frames -= i;
+                guest_handle_add_offset(copy.frame_list, i);
+                goto out;
+            }
+
+            /* A page is dirtied when it's being copied to. */
+            if ( direction == XENMEM_foreigncopy_to )
+                paging_mark_dirty(d, page_to_mfn(foreign_page));
+
+            foreign = map_domain_page(page_to_mfn(foreign_page));
+            if ( direction == XENMEM_foreigncopy_from )
+                rc = copy_to_guest(copy.buffer, foreign, PAGE_SIZE);
+            else
+                rc = copy_from_guest(foreign, copy.buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+            unmap_domain_page(foreign);
+            put_page(foreign_page);
+
+            if ( unlikely(rc) )
+            {
+                gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+                         "Error copying to mfn %" PRI_mfn "\n", gfn_list[i]);
+                copy.nr_frames -= i;
+                guest_handle_add_offset(copy.frame_list, i);
+                goto out;
+            }
+
+            guest_handle_add_offset(copy.buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+        }
+
+        copy.nr_frames -= todo;
+        guest_handle_add_offset(copy.frame_list, todo);
+
+        if ( copy.nr_frames && hypercall_preempt_check() )
+        {
+            rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
+                __HYPERVISOR_memory_op, "lh", XENMEM_foreigncopy, arg);
+            goto out;
+        }
+    } while ( copy.nr_frames );
+
+    rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+    rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+
+    /* Update in all cases, it allows the caller to know how many
+     * frames were successfully copied and the continuation to
+     * continue correctly.
+     */
+    if ( copy_to_guest(arg, &copy, 1) )
+        rc = -EFAULT;
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
  long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
  {
      struct domain *d, *curr_d = current->domain;
@@ -2012,6 +2138,13 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, 
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
              start_extent);
          break;
+ case XENMEM_foreigncopy:
+        if ( unlikely(start_extent) )
+            return -EINVAL;
+
+        rc = mem_foreigncopy(guest_handle_cast(arg, xen_foreigncopy_t));
+        break;
+
      default:
          rc = arch_memory_op(cmd, arg);
          break;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/memory.h b/xen/include/public/memory.h
index bd9fc37b52..b48d1f378f 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/memory.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/memory.h
@@ -740,7 +740,45 @@ struct xen_vnuma_topology_info {
  typedef struct xen_vnuma_topology_info xen_vnuma_topology_info_t;
  DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_vnuma_topology_info_t);
-/* Next available subop number is 29 */
+/*
+ * Copy memory from/to a given domain.
+ */
+#define XENMEM_foreigncopy 29
+struct xen_foreigncopy {
+    /* IN - The domain whose resource is to be copied. */
+    domid_t domid;
+
+    /* IN - Flags. */
+#define XENMEM_foreigncopy_from 0
+#define XENMEM_foreigncopy_to 1
+#define XENMEM_foreigncopy_direction 1
+    uint16_t flags;
+
+    /*
+     * IN
+     *
+     * As an IN parameter number of frames of the domain to be copied.
+     */
+    uint32_t nr_frames;
+

The interface only allows copies to be made at page granularity, while that can be ok, that probably wants to be stated.

+    /*
+     * IN
+     *
+     * Frames to be copied.
+     */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pfn_t) frame_list;
+
+    /*
+     * IN/OUT
+     *
+     * Userspace buffer to read/write from.
+     */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(uint8) buffer;
+};

The interface looks a bit asymetric, on one hand, it takes pfns and on the other hand, it takes a guest virtual address.

Though, using guest pointers is not great for PVH domains, as it requires expensive pagewalks (especially for a lot of pages).

Would it be preferable to have a list of gmfn for both sides ?

+typedef struct xen_foreigncopy xen_foreigncopy_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_foreigncopy_t);
+
+/* Next available subop number is 30 */
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_MEMORY_H__ */

Teddy

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