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Re: [PATCH v3 28/28] xen/domctl: wrap common/domctl.c with CONFIG_MGMT_HYPERCALLS


  • To: "Penny, Zheng" <penny.zheng@xxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 14:29:56 -0500
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On 2025-11-18 02:51, Penny, Zheng wrote:
[Public]

-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2025 3:14 PM
To: Penny, Zheng <penny.zheng@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Huang, Ray <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>; oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx; Andrew
Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Anthony PERARD
<anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>; Orzel, Michal <Michal.Orzel@xxxxxxx>; Julien
Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>; Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>; Stefano
Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>; xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 28/28] xen/domctl: wrap common/domctl.c with
CONFIG_MGMT_HYPERCALLS

On 18.11.2025 07:43, Penny, Zheng wrote:
[Public]

-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2025 9:40 PM
To: Penny, Zheng <penny.zheng@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Huang, Ray <Ray.Huang@xxxxxxx>; oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx;
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; Anthony PERARD
<anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>; Orzel, Michal <Michal.Orzel@xxxxxxx>;
Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>; Roger Pau Monné
<roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>; Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>;
xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 28/28] xen/domctl: wrap common/domctl.c with
CONFIG_MGMT_HYPERCALLS

On 13.10.2025 12:15, Penny Zheng wrote:
--- a/xen/common/Kconfig
+++ b/xen/common/Kconfig
@@ -646,11 +646,13 @@ config SYSTEM_SUSPEND
       If unsure, say N.

  config MGMT_HYPERCALLS
-   def_bool y
+   bool "Enable privileged hypercalls for system management"
     help
       This option shall only be disabled on some dom0less systems, or
       PV shim on x86, to reduce Xen footprint via managing unnessary

"unnecessary"

-     hypercalls, like sysctl, etc.
+     hypercalls, like sysctl, domctl, etc.
+     Be cautious to disable it, as users will face missing a few basic
+     hypercalls like listdomains, getdomaininfo, etc.

This is still too little, imo. For one I'm not sure "users" is quite
the right term. I'd say it's more "admins". And then, as mentioned,
there are a few domctl-s which are usable by DMs. Aiui device
pass-through may also be impacted, which imo will want mentioning
here as well. Or else, if there is an implication that DMs aren't to be used 
when
MGMT_HYPERCALLS=n, that is what would want calling out.

How about
"
         Be cautious to disable it, as admins will face missing a few basic
         hypercalls like listdomains, getdomaininfo, etc, hence leading to
         have an impact on xl-device-passthrough and restricted DM.
"

Much better. However, why "xl-" and why "restricted"? Neither aspect matters 
here,
unless I overlook something.


Later, in hyperlaunch scenario, device passthrough is still needed, but it's not current 
device passthrough mode, which depends on xl-tool-stack to de-assign it from hardware 
domain and re-assign it to guest. It will be limited in boot-up stage, and configured via 
device tree only. FWIU, we may reuse VPCI framework, but commands like "xl 
assign/deassign xxx" will not be needed anymore. PLZ correct me if understand 
wrongly, @Andryuk, Jason

Yes, this is correct.


And DM, like QEMU, is still applicable, but only supports a new machine type, 
"pvh".

vPCI is used to assign the PCI devices to a PVH domain during boot. QEMU is present and provides virtio devices, but it does not play a role in PCI passthrough. So far we've used independent PCI segments for vPCI and QEMU/virtio.

Anyway, maybe something like this for the help text:
"""
Management hypercalls provide the means for dom0 to manage the overall Xen system and other domains. This includes the hypercalls needed to construct new domains. In a dom0less or pv-shim build, they can be omitted to cut down on the Xen binary's size. However, this comes at the loss of significant runtime functionality.

Unless you know what you are doing, you should enable this.
"""

Regards,
Jason



 


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