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[PATCH v3 1/2] xen/arm: fix arm_iommu_map_page after f9f6b22abf1d


  • To: <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 18:51:24 -0400
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  • Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, "Julien Grall" <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>, Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@xxxxxxxx>, Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 22:52:03 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

From: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxx>

Up until f9f6b22abf1d "xen/arm: Map ITS doorbell register to IOMMU page
tables" the only caller of iommu_map on ARM was grant_table.c which has
a specific usage model and restrictions as described by the in-code
comment in arm_iommu_map_page.

f9f6b22abf1d introduced a second caller to iommu_map on ARM:
vgic_v3_its_init_virtual. This specific statement in the
f9f6b22abf1d commit message is partially wrong:

"Note that the 1:1 check in arm_iommu_map_page remains for now, as
virtual ITSes are currently only created for hwdom where the doorbell
mapping is always 1:1."

Leading to crashes any time the hardware domain is not direct-mapped
(e.g. cache coloring and non-Dom0 hardware domain):

(XEN) Xen BUG at drivers/passthrough/arm/iommu_helpers.c:47
[...]
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN)    [<00000a000024c758>] arm_iommu_map_page+0x80/0x90 (PC)
(XEN)    [<00000a000024c750>] arm_iommu_map_page+0x78/0x90 (LR)
(XEN)    [<00000a0000250884>] iommu_map+0xcc/0x29c
(XEN)    [<00000a0000288024>] vgic_v3_its_init_domain+0x18c/0x1e8
(XEN)    [<00000a0000285228>] vgic-v3.c#vgic_v3_domain_init+0x168/0x21c
(XEN)    [<00000a0000281dcc>] domain_vgic_init+0x14c/0x210
(XEN)    [<00000a00002705a4>] arch_domain_create+0x150/0x1f0
(XEN)    [<00000a00002055e8>] domain_create+0x47c/0x6c0
(XEN)    [<00000a00002cf090>] create_domUs+0x7f8/0x8cc
(XEN)    [<00000a00002eb588>] start_xen+0x8f4/0x998
(XEN)    [<00000a000020018c>] head.o#primary_switched+0x4/0x10

Specifically, non-1:1 hardware domain exists with cache coloring
enabled. For that, is_domain_direct_mapped(d) is false but
domain_use_host_layout(d) is true.

Change the is_domain_direct_mapped(d) checks in arm_iommu_map_page and
arm_iommu_unmap_page into domain_use_host_layout(d) checks.

Move the in-code comment specific to the grant table to grant-table.c.

Fixes: f9f6b22abf1d ("xen/arm: Map ITS doorbell register to IOMMU page tables")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@xxxxxxx>
---
v2->v3:
* split change into 2 patches
* 12-character commit IDs
* change both arm_iommu_map_page and arm_iommu_unmap_page
* s/IPA/GFN/ in comment
---
 xen/common/grant_table.c                    | 10 ++++++++--
 xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/iommu_helpers.c | 16 ++--------------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
index cf131c43a1f1..33d051dfe9b8 100644
--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
@@ -1274,8 +1274,14 @@ map_grant_ref(
         }
 
         /*
-         * We're not translated, so we know that dfns and mfns are
-         * the same things, so the IOMMU entry is always 1-to-1.
+         * Grant mappings can be used for DMA requests. The dev_bus_addr
+         * returned by the hypercall is the MFN (not the GFN). For
+         * device protected by an IOMMU, Xen needs to add a 1:1 mapping
+         * in the domain p2m to allow DMA request to work. This is only
+         * valid when the domain is directed mapped.
+         *
+         * We're not translated, so we know that dfns and mfns are the
+         * same things, so the IOMMU entry is always 1-to-1.
          */
         if ( !(op->flags & GNTMAP_readonly) && node.cnt.wr == 1 )
             kind = IOMMUF_readable | IOMMUF_writable;
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/iommu_helpers.c 
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/iommu_helpers.c
index 5cb198748193..bdb271584b0d 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/iommu_helpers.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/arm/iommu_helpers.c
@@ -36,15 +36,7 @@ int __must_check arm_iommu_map_page(struct domain *d, dfn_t 
dfn, mfn_t mfn,
 {
     p2m_type_t t;
 
-    /*
-     * Grant mappings can be used for DMA requests. The dev_bus_addr
-     * returned by the hypercall is the MFN (not the IPA). For device
-     * protected by an IOMMU, Xen needs to add a 1:1 mapping in the domain
-     * p2m to allow DMA request to work.
-     * This is only valid when the domain is directed mapped. Hence this
-     * function should only be used by gnttab code with gfn == mfn == dfn.
-     */
-    BUG_ON(!is_domain_direct_mapped(d));
+    BUG_ON(!domain_use_host_layout(d));
     BUG_ON(mfn_x(mfn) != dfn_x(dfn));
 
     /* We only support readable and writable flags */
@@ -66,11 +58,7 @@ int __must_check arm_iommu_unmap_page(struct domain *d, 
dfn_t dfn,
                                       unsigned int order,
                                       unsigned int *flush_flags)
 {
-    /*
-     * This function should only be used by gnttab code when the domain
-     * is direct mapped (i.e. gfn == mfn == dfn).
-     */
-    if ( !is_domain_direct_mapped(d) )
+    if ( !domain_use_host_layout(d) )
         return -EINVAL;
 
     return guest_physmap_remove_page(d, _gfn(dfn_x(dfn)), _mfn(dfn_x(dfn)),

base-commit: 2dee23ad966897cb8596e49f37e625bf483d544c
-- 
2.50.1




 


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