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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v2 04/17] xen: Introduce XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target
Add a new create domain flag to indicate if a domain can be the target
of hypercalls. By default all domains can be targetted - subject to any
other permission checks.
This property is useful in a safety environment to isolate domains for
freedom from interference.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx>
---
DOMAIN_CAPS_NOT_HYPERCALL_TARGET duplicates the hypercall-untargetable
DT property, so it could be removed. Leaving it here for now to at
least illustrate the alternate approach.
---
docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt | 6 ++++++
tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.ml | 1 +
tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.mli | 1 +
xen/arch/arm/domain.c | 3 ++-
xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c | 6 ++++++
xen/common/domain.c | 2 +-
xen/include/public/bootfdt.h | 10 ++++++++--
xen/include/public/domctl.h | 4 +++-
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 12 ++++++++++++
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 4 ++++
10 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
index 07acc7ba64..963dd81912 100644
--- a/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
+++ b/docs/misc/arm/device-tree/booting.txt
@@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ with the following properties:
passed through. This option is the default if this property is missing
and the user does not provide the device partial device tree for the
domain.
+- hypercall-untargetable
+
+ Optional. An empty property to specify the domain cannot be the target
+ of hypercalls. This protects a domain for freedom of interference from
+ other domains.
+
Under the "xen,domain" compatible node, one or more sub-nodes are present
for the DomU kernel and ramdisk.
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.ml
index f5835e7d95..00c29199dc 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.ml
+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.ml
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ type domain_create_flag =
| CDF_VPMU
| CDF_TRAP_UNMAPPED_ACCESSES
| CDF_DEVICE_MODEL
+ | CDF_NOT_HYPERCALL_TARGET
type domain_create_iommu_opts =
| IOMMU_NO_SHAREPT
diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.mli b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.mli
index b9471a56a8..daf6686f4d 100644
--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.mli
+++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xc/xenctrl.mli
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ type domain_create_flag =
| CDF_VPMU
| CDF_TRAP_UNMAPPED_ACCESSES
| CDF_DEVICE_MODEL
+ | CDF_NOT_HYPERCALL_TARGET
type domain_create_iommu_opts =
| IOMMU_NO_SHAREPT
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
index 57eecbd250..5f6358096f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/domain.c
@@ -614,7 +614,8 @@ int arch_sanitise_domain_config(struct
xen_domctl_createdomain *config)
unsigned int flags_optional = (XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_iommu | XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_vpmu |
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_xs_domain |
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_trap_unmapped_accesses |
- XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model);
+ XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model |
+ XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target);
unsigned int sve_vl_bits = sve_decode_vl(config->arch.sve_vl);
if ( (config->flags & ~flags_optional) != flags_required )
diff --git a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
index bb52291dfb..22af043aa5 100644
--- a/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
+++ b/xen/common/device-tree/dom0less-build.c
@@ -886,6 +886,9 @@ void __init create_domUs(void)
if ( val & DOMAIN_CAPS_DEVICE_MODEL )
d_cfg.flags |= XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model;
+
+ if ( val & DOMAIN_CAPS_NOT_HYPERCALL_TARGET )
+ d_cfg.flags |= XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target;
}
if ( dt_find_property(node, "xen,static-mem", NULL) )
@@ -896,6 +899,9 @@ void __init create_domUs(void)
flags |= CDF_staticmem;
}
+ if ( dt_property_read_bool(node, "hypercall-untargetable") )
+ d_cfg.flags |= XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target;
+
if ( dt_property_read_bool(node, "direct-map") )
{
if ( !(flags & CDF_staticmem) )
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 42c590b8d7..c347de4335 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ static int sanitise_domain_config(struct
xen_domctl_createdomain *config)
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_xs_domain | XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_iommu |
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_nested_virt | XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_vpmu |
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_trap_unmapped_accesses |
- XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model) )
+ XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model | XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target) )
{
dprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Unknown CDF flags %#x\n", config->flags);
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/bootfdt.h b/xen/include/public/bootfdt.h
index c6b5afc76a..1eba1cc487 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/bootfdt.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/bootfdt.h
@@ -32,8 +32,14 @@
* Hardware domain for running QEMU.
*/
#define DOMAIN_CAPS_DEVICE_MODEL (1U << 3)
+/*
+ * Domain cannot be the target of hypercalls. This provides the domain
+ * freedom from interference from other domains.
+ */
+#define DOMAIN_CAPS_NOT_HYPERCALL_TARGET (1U << 4)
-#define DOMAIN_CAPS_MASK (DOMAIN_CAPS_CONTROL | DOMAIN_CAPS_HARDWARE | \
- DOMAIN_CAPS_XENSTORE | DOMAIN_CAPS_DEVICE_MODEL )
+#define DOMAIN_CAPS_MASK (DOMAIN_CAPS_CONTROL | DOMAIN_CAPS_HARDWARE | \
+ DOMAIN_CAPS_XENSTORE | DOMAIN_CAPS_DEVICE_MODEL |
\
+ DOMAIN_CAPS_NOT_HYPERCALL_TARGET)
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_BOOTFDT_H__ */
diff --git a/xen/include/public/domctl.h b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
index 88a294c5be..f1f6f96bc2 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h
@@ -70,9 +70,11 @@ struct xen_domctl_createdomain {
#define XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_trap_unmapped_accesses (1U << 8)
/* Allow domain to provide device model for multiple other domains */
#define XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model (1U << 9)
+/* Domain cannot be the target of hypercalls */
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target (1U << 10)
/* Max XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_* constant. Used for ABI checking. */
-#define XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_MAX XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_MAX XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target
uint32_t flags;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 9863603d93..8a32f9a1b6 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -1157,6 +1157,18 @@ static always_inline bool is_dm_domain(const struct
domain *d)
return evaluate_nospec(d->options & XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_device_model);
}
+/*
+ * Return whether this domain can be the target of hypercalls from other
+ * domains.
+ */
+static always_inline bool is_hypercall_target(const struct domain *d)
+{
+ if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV_SHIM_EXCLUSIVE) )
+ return true;
+
+ return evaluate_nospec(!(d->options &
XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_not_hypercall_target));
+}
+
#define VM_ASSIST(d, t) (test_bit(VMASST_TYPE_ ## t, &(d)->vm_assist))
static always_inline bool is_pv_domain(const struct domain *d)
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index 0b341efd18..f2205575ed 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -91,12 +91,16 @@ static always_inline int xsm_default_action(
return 0;
fallthrough;
case XSM_DM_PRIV:
+ if ( target && !is_hypercall_target(target) )
+ return -EPERM;
if ( is_dm_domain(src) )
return 0;
if ( target && evaluate_nospec(src->target == target) )
return 0;
fallthrough;
case XSM_PRIV:
+ if ( target && !is_hypercall_target(target) )
+ return -EPERM;
if ( is_control_domain(src) )
return 0;
return -EPERM;
--
2.50.0
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