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[Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] Enable SMEP CPU feature support for XEN hypervisor


  • To: "'Keir Fraser (keir.xen@xxxxxxxxx)'" <keir.xen@xxxxxxxxx>
  • From: "Li, Xin" <xin.li@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2011 21:57:45 +0800
  • Accept-language: zh-CN, en-US
  • Acceptlanguage: zh-CN, en-US
  • Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 03 Jun 2011 06:59:28 -0700
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com>
  • Thread-index: Acwh9jTkNLQTp7L0Sd25RhWDyT37cg==
  • Thread-topic: [PATCH v2] Enable SMEP CPU feature support for XEN hypervisor

Intel new CPU supports SMEP (Supervisor Mode Execution Protection). SMEP
prevents software operating with CPL < 3 (supervisor mode) from fetching
instructions from any linear address with a valid translation for which the U/S
flag (bit 2) is 1 in every paging-structure entry controlling the translation
for the linear address.

This patch enables SMEP in Xen to protect Xen hypervisor from executing pv guest
instructions, whose translation paging-structure entries' U/S flags are all set.

It crashes a pv guest triggering SMEP fault.

Signed-off-by: Yang Wei <wei.y.yang@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Shan Haitao <haitao.shan@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Li Xin <xin.li@xxxxxxxxx>

diff -r 0791661a32d8 xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c Thu Jun 02 18:46:35 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c Fri Jun 03 19:59:43 2011 +0800
@@ -222,6 +222,22 @@ static void __init early_cpu_detect(void
        c->x86_capability[4] = cap4;
 }
 
+/* nosmep: if true, Intel SMEP is disabled. */
+static bool_t disable_smep __cpuinitdata;
+boolean_param("nosmep", disable_smep);
+
+static void __cpuinit setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+       if ( cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP) ) {
+               if ( unlikely(disable_smep) )
+                       setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
+               else {
+                       set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_SMEP);
+                       mmu_cr4_features |= X86_CR4_SMEP;
+               }
+       }
+}
+
 void __cpuinit generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 * c)
 {
        u32 tfms, xlvl, capability, excap, ebx;
@@ -268,6 +284,8 @@ void __cpuinit generic_identify(struct c
                c->x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE / 32] = ebx;
        }
 
+       setup_smep(c);
+
        early_intel_workaround(c);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_HT
diff -r 0791661a32d8 xen/arch/x86/traps.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c      Thu Jun 02 18:46:35 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c      Fri Jun 03 19:59:43 2011 +0800
@@ -1139,7 +1139,13 @@ static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(
     (((va) >= HYPERVISOR_VIRT_START))
 #endif
 
-static int __spurious_page_fault(
+enum pf_type {
+    real_page_fault,
+    smep_fault,
+    spurious_fault
+};
+
+static enum pf_type __page_fault_type(
     unsigned long addr, unsigned int error_code)
 {
     unsigned long mfn, cr3 = read_cr3();
@@ -1151,7 +1157,7 @@ static int __spurious_page_fault(
 #endif
     l2_pgentry_t l2e, *l2t;
     l1_pgentry_t l1e, *l1t;
-    unsigned int required_flags, disallowed_flags;
+    unsigned int required_flags, disallowed_flags, u_flag;
 
     /*
      * We do not take spurious page faults in IRQ handlers as we do not
@@ -1159,11 +1165,11 @@ static int __spurious_page_fault(
      * map_domain_page() is not IRQ-safe.
      */
     if ( in_irq() )
-        return 0;
+        return real_page_fault;
 
     /* Reserved bit violations are never spurious faults. */
     if ( error_code & PFEC_reserved_bit )
-        return 0;
+        return real_page_fault;
 
     required_flags  = _PAGE_PRESENT;
     if ( error_code & PFEC_write_access )
@@ -1175,6 +1181,8 @@ static int __spurious_page_fault(
     if ( error_code & PFEC_insn_fetch )
         disallowed_flags |= _PAGE_NX_BIT;
 
+    u_flag = _PAGE_USER;
+
     mfn = cr3 >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 #if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4
@@ -1184,7 +1192,9 @@ static int __spurious_page_fault(
     unmap_domain_page(l4t);
     if ( ((l4e_get_flags(l4e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
          (l4e_get_flags(l4e) & disallowed_flags) )
-        return 0;
+        return real_page_fault;
+
+    u_flag &= l4e_get_flags(l4e);
 #endif
 
 #if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3
@@ -1197,13 +1207,23 @@ static int __spurious_page_fault(
     unmap_domain_page(l3t);
 #if CONFIG_PAGING_LEVELS == 3
     if ( !(l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
-        return 0;
+        return real_page_fault;
 #else
     if ( ((l3e_get_flags(l3e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
          (l3e_get_flags(l3e) & disallowed_flags) )
-        return 0;
-    if ( l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PSE )
-        return 1;
+        return real_page_fault;
+
+    u_flag &= l3e_get_flags(l3e);
+
+    if ( l3e_get_flags(l3e) & _PAGE_PSE ) {
+        /* SMEP fault error code 10001b */
+        if ( (error_code & PFEC_insn_fetch) &&
+             !(error_code & PFEC_user_mode) &&
+             cpu_has_smep && u_flag )
+            return smep_fault;
+
+        return spurious_fault;
+    }
 #endif
 #endif
 
@@ -1213,9 +1233,19 @@ static int __spurious_page_fault(
     unmap_domain_page(l2t);
     if ( ((l2e_get_flags(l2e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
          (l2e_get_flags(l2e) & disallowed_flags) )
-        return 0;
-    if ( l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE )
-        return 1;
+        return real_page_fault;
+
+    u_flag &= l2e_get_flags(l2e);
+
+    if ( l2e_get_flags(l2e) & _PAGE_PSE ) {
+        /* SMEP fault error code 10001b */
+        if ( (error_code & PFEC_insn_fetch) &&
+             !(error_code & PFEC_user_mode) &&
+             cpu_has_smep && u_flag )
+            return smep_fault;
+
+        return spurious_fault;
+    }
 
     l1t = map_domain_page(mfn);
     l1e = l1e_read_atomic(&l1t[l1_table_offset(addr)]);
@@ -1223,26 +1253,37 @@ static int __spurious_page_fault(
     unmap_domain_page(l1t);
     if ( ((l1e_get_flags(l1e) & required_flags) != required_flags) ||
          (l1e_get_flags(l1e) & disallowed_flags) )
-        return 0;
-
-    return 1;
+        return real_page_fault;
+
+    u_flag &= l1e_get_flags(l1e);
+
+    /* SMEP fault error code 10001b */
+    if ( (error_code & PFEC_insn_fetch) &&
+         !(error_code & PFEC_user_mode) &&
+         cpu_has_smep && u_flag )
+        return smep_fault;
+
+    return spurious_fault;
 }
 
 static int spurious_page_fault(
     unsigned long addr, unsigned int error_code)
 {
     unsigned long flags;
-    int           is_spurious;
+    enum pf_type  pf_type;
 
     /*
      * Disabling interrupts prevents TLB flushing, and hence prevents
      * page tables from becoming invalid under our feet during the walk.
      */
     local_irq_save(flags);
-    is_spurious = __spurious_page_fault(addr, error_code);
+    pf_type = __page_fault_type(addr, error_code);
     local_irq_restore(flags);
 
-    return is_spurious;
+    if ( pf_type == smep_fault )
+        domain_crash_synchronous();
+
+    return (pf_type == spurious_fault);
 }
 
 static int fixup_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
diff -r 0791661a32d8 xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h  Thu Jun 02 18:46:35 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h  Fri Jun 03 19:59:43 2011 +0800
@@ -141,8 +141,9 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_TBM         (6*32+21) /* trailing bit manipulations */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT     (6*32+22) /* topology extensions CPUID leafs */
 
-/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx), word 9 */
+/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ebx), word 7 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE   (7*32+ 0) /* {RD,WR}{FS,GS}BASE instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SMEP       (7*32+ 7) /* Supervisor Mode Execution 
Protection */
 
 #define cpu_has(c, bit)                test_bit(bit, (c)->x86_capability)
 #define boot_cpu_has(bit)      test_bit(bit, boot_cpu_data.x86_capability)
@@ -202,6 +203,8 @@
 #define cpu_has_fsgsbase       boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)
 #endif
 
+#define cpu_has_smep            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)
+
 #define cpu_has_ffxsr           ((boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) \
                                  && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FFXSR))
 
diff -r 0791661a32d8 xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h      Thu Jun 02 18:46:35 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h      Fri Jun 03 19:59:43 2011 +0800
@@ -527,12 +527,14 @@ unsigned long pv_guest_cr4_fixup(const s
 /* Convert between guest-visible and real CR4 values. */
 #define pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4(v)                         \
     (((v)->arch.pv_vcpu.ctrlreg[4]                          \
-      | (mmu_cr4_features & (X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE))    \
-      | ((v)->domain->arch.vtsc ? X86_CR4_TSD : 0)         \
-      | ((xsave_enabled(v))? X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0))              \
-      & ~X86_CR4_DE)
-#define real_cr4_to_pv_guest_cr4(c) \
-    ((c) & ~(X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE))
+      | (mmu_cr4_features                                   \
+         & (X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_SMEP))      \
+      | ((v)->domain->arch.vtsc ? X86_CR4_TSD : 0)          \
+      | ((xsave_enabled(v))? X86_CR4_OSXSAVE : 0))          \
+     & ~X86_CR4_DE)
+#define real_cr4_to_pv_guest_cr4(c)                         \
+    ((c) & ~(X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_TSD        \
+             | X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_SMEP))
 
 void domain_cpuid(struct domain *d,
                   unsigned int  input,
diff -r 0791661a32d8 xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h   Thu Jun 02 18:46:35 2011 +0100
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h   Fri Jun 03 19:59:43 2011 +0800
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 #define X86_CR4_SMXE           0x4000  /* enable SMX */
 #define X86_CR4_FSGSBASE       0x10000 /* enable {rd,wr}{fs,gs}base */
 #define X86_CR4_OSXSAVE        0x40000 /* enable XSAVE/XRSTOR */
+#define X86_CR4_SMEP           0x100000/* enable SMEP */
 
 /*
  * Trap/fault mnemonics.

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