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Re: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - VT-d (PCI passthrough) MSI



At 18:19 +0100 on 20 May (1305915548), Ian Jackson wrote:
> Tim Deegan writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - 
> VT-d (PCI passthrough) MSI"):
> > At 21:48 +0100 on 19 May (1305841716), Cihula, Joseph wrote:
> > > So how would the user (or installation SW) specify to use the best
> > > (IOMMU) security available on the platform?
> > 
> > iommu=on.  That pretty much lines up with the current meaining. 
> > 
> > Only iommu=force requires a fully secure IOMMU, and you can
> > overide that with iommu=force,nointremap.  
> 
> I think this is the best behaviour.  Do we have a patch that
> implements it ?  If I'm not confused, the patch further upthread
> crashes on lack of intremap even with iommu=on.

AIUI Ian Campbell's most recent patch does exactly this.  Ian?

Tim.

-- 
Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx>
Principal Software Engineer, Xen Platform Team
Citrix Systems UK Ltd.  (Company #02937203, SL9 0BG)

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