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RE: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT


  • To: "Ashish Bijlani" <ashish.bijlani@xxxxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: "Cui, Dexuan" <dexuan.cui@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2007 08:08:21 +0800
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 25 Oct 2007 17:09:06 -0700
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com>
  • Thread-index: AcgXYQlsUDdypRoiSy2dnJ+RDcsazgAAPtYg
  • Thread-topic: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT

> From: xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> [mailto:xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ashish Bijlani
> Sent: 2007年10月26日 7:44
> To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT

> if I push xen's some addr (cs & eip) on the target guest os krnl stack when 
> an interrupt occurs, would the guest os krnl return to xen
> immediately upon executing iret (as iret pops cs, eip from the krnl stack)? 
> or would it make a vmexit coz of some illegal addr access 
 
I assume you're only talking about Intel VMX guest. The answer is NO.
For instance, a VMX guest is running in "non-root mode"; it can only use its 
(shadowed) page table; it can't use IRET to return to Xen that's running on 
"root mode".
If you did that, what would happen is, i.e., a 32-bit protection-mode guest 
uses its own GDT -- the guest may find the GDT entry indexed by Xen's CS is 
invalid, so a #GP is generated in guest directly, and guest handles this (No 
VMexit).

-- Dexuan

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