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RE: [Xen-devel] Re: [Xense-devel] [RFC][PATCH][UPDATED] Intel(R)LaGrande Technology support

On Sunday, September 24, 2006 1:02 AM,  Leendert Van Doorn <> wrote:
> I'm not sure how many people experimented with this code yet, but
> there is a dependency that isn't articulated in its README.
> For me to make this work, I had to compile Xen with PAE support (set
> XEN_TARGET_X86_PAE=y in Config.mk)  and use the PAE version of the
> SINIT authenticated code module (lpg_sinit_20050831_pae.auth.bin).
> Using a non-PAE version of Xen and lpg_sinit_20050831.auth.bin caused
> SENTER to fail and reset the machine.

Sorry for the late reply, but I've just returned from vacation.

I appologize for the unclear instructions in the post.  It is not
required to build Xen for PAE.  However, the version of the SINIT AC
module that has "pae" in the file name must be used in all
configurations--this actually refers to the format of the page table
that describes the MVMM and not the processor mode of the code.  All
future SINIT modules will only support this version of MVMM page tables.

> Some of the comments in the code seem to suggest that it expects the
> mvmm to be in PAE mode, so it is probably an assumption in the code.
>       Leendert
> -----------------------
> Dr. Leendert van Doorn
> Senior Manager - Secure Systems and Tools
> IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
>              "Cihula, Joseph"
>              <joseph.cihula@in
>              tel.com>                                                
>              To Sent by:                 
>              <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, xense-devel-bounc      
>              <xense-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> es@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx     
>              cc e.com
>                                        Subject [Xense-devel]
>              [RFC][PATCH][UPDATED] 09/22/2006 03:00          Intel(R)
>              LaGrande Technology PM                        support
> This patch adds SMP support to the previous version.  Since that has
> not been merged I have included it in this patch.  This should apply
> cleanly to the tip.  Below is the text of the original submittal,
> slightly updated.
> Attached is a preliminary patch that adds Intel(R) LaGrande Technology
> (LT) (Safer Mode Extensions - SMX) support to Xen.  While there are
> still several enhancements needed for complete support, we feel that
> it is sufficiently complete for an initial public posting to expose
> to the community.
> LaGrande Technology in Brief:
> -----------------------------
> o  Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
> o  DMA protection
> o  Data protection in case of improper shutdown
> For more information on LT, see the Intel LaGrande Technology website:
> http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
> This site also has a link to the LT preliminary specification (an
> updated version that reflects the functionlaity of this code will be
> available later this week).
> The LT functionality this code adds is:
> ---------------------------------------
> o  Measured Launch.  If the processor is detected as being LT-capable
> and enabled then the code will attempt to perform a measured launch. 
> If the processor is (not capable) or (capable but not enabled) or
> (capable and enabled but the launch process fails (missing SINIT,
> corrupted data, etc.)) then it will fall-through to a non-LT boot.
> o  Teardown of measured environment.  When Xen exits the LT
> environment will be torn down properly.
> o  Reset data protection.  LT HW prevents access to secrets if the
> system is reset without clearing them from memory (as part of a LT
> teardown).  This code will support this by setting the flag indicating
> that memory should be so protected during the measured launch and
> clearing the flag just before teardown.
> o  Protection of LT memory ranges.  LT reserves certain regions of RAM
> for its use and also defines several MMIO regions.  These regions are
> protected from use by any domains (including dom0).  Note that there a
> sub-regions of the MMIO space that are left accessible to dom0 (LT
> public configuration space, TPM localities 0,1).
> Patch breakdown:
> ----------------
> Config.mk - add INTEL_SMX build config
> xen/Rules.mk - adds '-DCONFIG_SMX' compile flag if INTEL_SMX=y
> xen/arch/x86/Makefile - add arch/x86/smx dir to build
> xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_32.S - hook startup to launch LT
> environmentxen/arch/x86/setup.c - initialize fixmap entries for LT
> config reg space
> xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c - protect LT private config space
> xen/arch/x86/e820.c - support for E820_PROTECTED mem type
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c - support new LT/VMX
> xen/arch/x86/mm.c - support for E820_PROTECTED mem type
> xen/arch/x86/setup.c - hook to reserve LT RAM regions and initialize
> fixmap entries for LT config reg space
> xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c - hook shutdown to teardown LT environment
> xen/common/domctl.c - prevent XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission from being
> able to map LT private config space
> xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h - adds new SMX feature flag
> xen/include/asm-x86/e820.h - export print_e820_memory_map()
> xen/include/asm-x86/fixmap.h - adds fixmap entries for LT config reg
> space
> xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h - adds new VMX and SMX MSR flags
> xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h - adds new CR4 SMX flag
> xen/include/public/hvm/e820.h - add E820_PROTECTED mem type
> xen/arch/x86/smx/Makefile - self explanatory
> xen/arch/x86/smx/acmod.c - LT Authenticated Code (AC) module support
> fns xen/arch/x86/smx/early_printk.c - serial printk() for early in
> boot process
> xen/arch/x86/smx/errors.c - error parsing/display fns
> xen/arch/x86/smx/mtrrs.c - MTRR handling for AC module launch
> xen/arch/x86/smx/smx.c - main LT/SMX fns and entry points
> xen/arch/x86/smx/tpm.c - basic TPM support fns
> xen/include/asm-x86/smx/* - headers for SMX/LT fns
> This code has been developed and tested on Intel Software Development
> Platform (SDP) 3 systems (available under NDA via the Intel Premier
> Support channel).  It will be updated to work with the LT Technology
> Enabling Platform (TEP) that will be publicly available this fall.
> Instructions for use:
> ---------------------
> o  By default, the functionality is disabled in the build.  It can be
> enabled by changing the INTEL_SMX flag to 'y' in Config.mk.
> o  The SINIT AC module (available with SDP3 systems) must be added to
> the grub.conf boot config as the last module, e.g.:
>              ...
>              module /initrd-
>              module /lpg_sinit_20050831_pae.auth.bin
> o  Progress of the LT launch process is indicated via debug printk's
> to COM1 (hardcoded).  These appear before the normal "(XEN)" output
> and are prefixed by "SMX:".  The code (in early_printk.c) does not
> initialize 
> the COM port so this needs to be done by GRUB - grub.conf should have:
>              serial --speed=115200 --unit=0
>              terminal console serial
> Caveats / Notes:
> ----------------
> o  x86_64 is not supported yet (IA64 does not support LT at this
> time). 
> o  The code only measures the hypervisor (and its command line), which
> is not the complete TCB.
> o  It doesn't cap (extend with invalid value) the dynamic TPM PCRs
> when the LT environment is torn down.  Instead it disables the BIOS
> reboot option so that any shutdown/reboot will have to reset the
> platform and the TPM.
> o  TPM locality 2 is not protected.  The defined behavior for access
> to unpermitted localities is for reads to return 0xff's and writes to
> be dropped.  This will require mapping pages from locality 3 or 4
> into the locality 2 range.
> o  No DMA protection has been implemented in this patch.  SDP3 only
> supports the NoDMA table for DMA protection and this will be
> superseded by VT-d.  VT-d support for LT will be added after it is
> added for the general case.
> These limitations will be addressed in subsequent patches.
> There was a presentation on the code at the Xen Summit.  More
> information on LT is available at
> http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.  Comments and feedback are
> welcome at any time.
> Joseph Cihula
> (Linux) Software Security Architect
> Open Source Technology Center
> Intel Corp.
> *** These opinions are not necessarily those of my employer ***
> [attachment "intel_lagrande_tech_smp.patch" deleted by Leendert Van
> Doorn/Watson/IBM] _______________________________________________
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