I think the challenges are bigger than with separate physicals
boxes. You have
to approach from a theoretical point of view. It's not that
because there are
no breaches or exploits today, that there will never be.
The theory is this:
maximum seclusion is maximum security. Two separate boxes
in two separate
networks in let's say two separate buildings (physical
security is also part
of the game) will be the most secure. Xen
presents an exception to this: the
seclusion is created by software. In
theory it is the same thing as physical
seclusion, until the software fails
or is compromised.
Another thing is human error: you WILL make mistakes. One
of those mistakes
may open open the wrong port, erase the wrong LUN, bridge
the wrong NIC. I've
done quite some security in my time and the biggest
problem is always human
error. We need to humbly acknowledge this.
In
short: it's certainly a bigger risk, but the consequences of
compromising
your server might lead you to accept this risk.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I 100% agree with you on this :) By splitting things up, you can
limit the "damage zone". And I can see what you mean about the human area
- you really need your head screwed on when working with all this stuff!
Do people on this list generally trust Xen with their private data,
mixed with public VMs? The folks over at Slicehost, Amazon etc.. seem
to...