 Home |
Products |
Support |
Community |
News |
xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] tools: add XS_RESTRICT operation to C xenstore c
| To: | Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
|---|---|
| Subject: | Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] tools: add XS_RESTRICT operation to C xenstore client libs. |
| From: | Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
| Date: | Fri, 2 Jul 2010 18:43:39 +0100 |
| Cc: | "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
| Delivery-date: | Fri, 02 Jul 2010 10:44:36 -0700 |
| Envelope-to: | www-data@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx |
| In-reply-to: | <19502.6363.477323.378577@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
| List-help: | <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=help> |
| List-id: | Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com> |
| List-post: | <mailto:xen-devel@lists.xensource.com> |
| List-subscribe: | <http://lists.xensource.com/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel>, <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=subscribe> |
| List-unsubscribe: | <http://lists.xensource.com/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel>, <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=unsubscribe> |
| Sender: | xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx |
| Thread-index: | AcsaBtRzq5y8nRFrRSultmtjOKgHiQAB0ZAu |
| Thread-topic: | [Xen-devel] [PATCH] tools: add XS_RESTRICT operation to C xenstore client libs. |
| User-agent: | Microsoft-Entourage/12.24.0.100205 |
On 02/07/2010 17:50, "Ian Jackson" <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Tim Deegan writes ("[Xen-devel] [PATCH] tools: add XS_RESTRICT operation to C
> xenstore client libs."):
>> The OCaml xenstored supports the XS_RESTRICT operation, which
>> deprivileges a dom0 xenstore connection so it can only affect one
>> domain's entries. Add the relevant definitions to the C libraries
>> so that callers can use it.
>
> Can you explain what this is for, please ? If it's for security
> against a hostile caller, what prevents the caller from simply opening
> another xenstore connection ?
A daemon like qemu-dm can do privileged things like opening a xenstore
connection, and then deprivilege itself via setuid() before handling I/O
requests and exposing itself on that particular attack front. XS_RESTRICT
allows such a service to further and more precisely deprivilege itself.
-- Keir
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
|
| <Prev in Thread] | Current Thread | [Next in Thread> |
|---|---|---|
| ||
| Previous by Date: | RE: [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH 0/12] PV on HVM Xen, Stefano Stabellini |
|---|---|
| Next by Date: | [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] AMD OSVW (OS Visible Workaround) for Xen, Keir Fraser |
| Previous by Thread: | Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] tools: add XS_RESTRICT operation to C xenstore client libs., Ian Jackson |
| Next by Thread: | [Xen-devel] [PATCH] pygrub: fix a typo, Tim Deegan |
| Indexes: | [Date] [Thread] [Top] [All Lists] |
