On 03/30/2010 09:00 AM, Keir Fraser wrote:
> On 29/03/2010 22:09, "Joanna Rutkowska" <joanna@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>> ...and then publish it on xen.org and sent to xen-devel. The list is
>> mirrored in a few places, so it would not be trivial for the attacker to
>> subvert the public key in all the public archives. Users can always use
>> more than one different internet connections to verify the key, to get
>> around potential compromise at an ISP level.
>>
>> This could be your "master key" and then you could simply sign other
>> keys (e.g. Jermey's, Keir's, etc) with this master key (simple gpg -s,
>> no certs, no web of trust, needed).
>
> I chatted with Ian Jackson about this, and our thought was to generate a
> xen.org master key which we would keep safe in Cambridge: only he and I
> would have copies of it (the two of us, for redundancy). We can also
> generate a software-signing key, signed by the master key, which we actually
> use for the business of signing releases from the xen-*.hg and
> qemu-xen-*.git repositories.
>
> We weren't sure it makes sense for Jeremy to sign anything since he's not
> actually making releases out of his repository. If we decide that Jeremy
> should sign things I think it best he makes his own key and we sign it with
> the master key.
>
Right. But I think it would make lots of sense for Jeremy to tag, at
least some of the pvops branches (stable-2.6.{31.32}.x), anyway.
Otherwise this every-changing repo might scare away lots of people.
Perhaps Jeremy could apply some tag (and sign it) every week, or after
some more major merges, etc.
Would be nice e.g. to have some particular commit from the pvops marked
as the official release for the upcoming Xen 4.0.0, wouldn't it?
joanna.
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