WARNING - OLD ARCHIVES

This is an archived copy of the Xen.org mailing list, which we have preserved to ensure that existing links to archives are not broken. The live archive, which contains the latest emails, can be found at http://lists.xen.org/
   
 
 
Xen 
 
Home Products Support Community News
 
   
 

xen-devel

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3 of 7] xen: allows more hypercalls from stubdoms

To: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <Stefano.Stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3 of 7] xen: allows more hypercalls from stubdoms
From: Keir Fraser <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2009 19:50:51 +0100
Cc: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Delivery-date: Mon, 12 Oct 2009 11:51:23 -0700
Envelope-to: www-data@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <20091012181912.GB5730@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
List-help: <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=help>
List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com>
List-post: <mailto:xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>
List-subscribe: <http://lists.xensource.com/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel>, <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=subscribe>
List-unsubscribe: <http://lists.xensource.com/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel>, <mailto:xen-devel-request@lists.xensource.com?subject=unsubscribe>
Sender: xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Thread-index: AcpLaJlf8IrJ8o1ARkGTclG/EsWyMAABFHzd
Thread-topic: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3 of 7] xen: allows more hypercalls from stubdoms
User-agent: Microsoft-Entourage/12.20.0.090605
On 12/10/2009 19:19, "Samuel Thibault" <samuel.thibault@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>> BTW: it cannot be worse than opening /dev/mem O_RDWR in qemu-xen, that
>> is exactly what happens at the moment.
> 
> Sure, but the difference is that qemu-xen is known to be run as root
> in dom0, while allowing things from the hypervisor potentially hides
> security leaks in its source code.

Also, one of the advantages of stubdom is supposed to be that it contains
qemu's large attack surface within a deprivileged environment.

The hard thing about passthru in a stubdom is that every relevant hypercall
really needs to be audited and potentially redesigned so that it all works
but according to principle of least privilege.

The alternative is rather undesirable, but perhaps acceptable if we make
that choice with our eyes open to it.

 -- Keir



_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

<Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread>