Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][ACM] kernel enforcement of vbd policies via blkback driver

[Keir Fraser <Keir.Fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On 26 Jul 2006, at 14:25, Mike D. Day wrote:

> > The tools hook is not just a usability/conformity check. The check 
> > ensures that the tools will not set up entries in xenstore that would 
> > allow blkback to create a non-conformant vbd. So there is no way for 
> > a guest to trick blkback into creating a non-conformant vbd: it can 
> > only connect to vbds specified in its config file or added later via 
> > the vbd-add xm hotplug command. The tools stack should perform its 
> > compiance checks on both 'xm create' and 'xm vbd-add', and that 
> > should be sufficient.
> Yes, but that relies on the tools being correct and invulnerable to 
> attacks like buffer overflow. Further, it does not disallow an 
> alternative tool from bypassing or corrupting the conformance and 
> authorization policy. Any program with the ability to open a socket to 
> xenstore can open the way. Allowing the checks within the hypervisor 
> is much safer against these types of attacks or errors.
If an attacker has access to the control plane (essentially anything 
with root privileges in domain0) what is to stop him from creating his 
own domain, with security credentials allowing it to communicate with 
domains A and B, and with its own proxy comms driver for circumventing 
any Xen checks that are intended to prevent communication between A and 
B?
 -- Keir


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