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xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] protecting xen startup
On Tue, Nov 23, 2004 at 11:00:57PM +0100, Jan Kundr?t wrote:
> Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton wrote:
> >
> > perhaps i should explain: i am looking to use xen to implement
> > a new level of paranoid security.
> >
> > i aim to run single applications, such as firefox and
> > openoffice, in their own dedicated virtual machines, a
> > localised file server in one (or more if i can get GFS or OCFS2
> > to work) virtual machine(s), and for the applications to each
> > connect to the xen master running an x-server [nomachine isn't
> > quite suitable, i may have to write my own ssh-based x-proxy].
>
> Do you mean running xserver in domain0?
um, yes.
> You should better setup separate
> domain for it.
really? is that possible?
can i run an xserver in a separate guest OS and still allow the guest
OS direct access to the screen?
how is that done - via a framebuffer drive?
tellmetellme!!!!
> But are you sure that such a setup will be usable and fast enough?
i gonna find out :)
> > allowing a compromised guest OS to fire up another virtual
> > machine, connect to the x-server and spoof "please enter your
> > password" dialog boxes is therefore to be avoided!!!
>
> If I'm not mistaken, you can start up new VMs only from domain0 or
> through HTTP interface, So you can easily firewall all traffic inside
> domain0 to local port 8000 (except for 127.0.0.1/32).
yeh, *grumble*, and you can also, in selinux, ban applications from
accessing a port.
> j.
>
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