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[Xen-changelog] Remove unused VERIFY_READ and VERIFY_WRITE parameters fr

To: xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Xen-changelog] Remove unused VERIFY_READ and VERIFY_WRITE parameters from the
From: BitKeeper Bot <riel@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 19 Apr 2005 13:48:05 +0000
Delivery-date: Tue, 19 Apr 2005 14:04:00 +0000
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ChangeSet 1.1327, 2005/04/19 14:48:05+01:00, kaf24@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

        Remove unused VERIFY_READ and VERIFY_WRITE parameters from the
        access_ok, user-space memory check macros.
        Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>



 arch/x86/mm.c                    |    8 ++++----
 arch/x86/traps.c                 |    8 ++++----
 arch/x86/x86_32/usercopy.c       |    6 +++---
 arch/x86/x86_64/usercopy.c       |    6 +++---
 common/dom_mem_ops.c             |    8 ++++----
 common/grant_table.c             |    4 ++--
 common/multicall.c               |    3 +--
 common/physdev.c                 |    2 +-
 include/asm-x86/x86_32/uaccess.h |    9 +++------
 include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h |    7 ++-----
 10 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)


diff -Nru a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c 2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c 2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@
         goto out;
     }
 
-    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uops, count, sizeof(op))) )
+    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(uops, count, sizeof(op))) )
     {
         rc = -EFAULT;
         goto out;
@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@
             unsigned long ents = op.nr_ents;
             if ( ((ptr & (PAGE_SIZE-1)) != 0) || 
                  (ents > 8192) ||
-                 !array_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, ptr, ents, LDT_ENTRY_SIZE) )
+                 !array_access_ok(ptr, ents, LDT_ENTRY_SIZE) )
             {
                 okay = 0;
                 MEM_LOG("Bad args to SET_LDT: ptr=%p, ents=%p", ptr, ents);
@@ -1819,7 +1819,7 @@
     perfc_addc(num_page_updates, count);
     perfc_incr_histo(bpt_updates, count, PT_UPDATES);
 
-    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, ureqs, count, sizeof(req))) )
+    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(ureqs, count, sizeof(req))) )
     {
         rc = -EFAULT;
         goto out;
@@ -2591,7 +2591,7 @@
     struct domain *d = current->domain;
 
     /* Aligned access only, thank you. */
-    if ( !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, addr, bytes) || ((addr & (bytes-1)) != 0) )
+    if ( !access_ok(addr, bytes) || ((addr & (bytes-1)) != 0) )
     {
         MEM_LOG("ptwr_emulate: Unaligned or bad size ptwr access (%d, %p)\n",
                 bytes, addr);
diff -Nru a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -1105,25 +1105,25 @@
     switch ( reg )
     {
     case 0: 
-        if ( !access_ok(VERIFY_READ, value, sizeof(long)) )
+        if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) )
             return -EPERM;
         if ( p == current ) 
             __asm__ ( "mov %0, %%db0" : : "r" (value) );
         break;
     case 1: 
-        if ( !access_ok(VERIFY_READ, value, sizeof(long)) )
+        if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) )
             return -EPERM;
         if ( p == current ) 
             __asm__ ( "mov %0, %%db1" : : "r" (value) );
         break;
     case 2: 
-        if ( !access_ok(VERIFY_READ, value, sizeof(long)) )
+        if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) )
             return -EPERM;
         if ( p == current ) 
             __asm__ ( "mov %0, %%db2" : : "r" (value) );
         break;
     case 3:
-        if ( !access_ok(VERIFY_READ, value, sizeof(long)) )
+        if ( !access_ok(value, sizeof(long)) )
             return -EPERM;
         if ( p == current ) 
             __asm__ ( "mov %0, %%db3" : : "r" (value) );
diff -Nru a/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/usercopy.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/usercopy.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/usercopy.c    2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_32/usercopy.c    2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
 unsigned long
 clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
 {
-       if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+       if (access_ok(to, n))
                __do_clear_user(to, n);
        return n;
 }
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@
 unsigned long
 copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-       if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+       if (access_ok(to, n))
                n = __copy_to_user(to, from, n);
        return n;
 }
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@
 unsigned long
 copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 {
-       if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
+       if (access_ok(from, n))
                n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n);
        else
                memset(to, 0, n);
diff -Nru a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/usercopy.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/usercopy.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/usercopy.c    2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/usercopy.c    2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
 
 unsigned long clear_user(void *to, unsigned long n)
 {
-       if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+       if (access_ok(to, n))
                return __clear_user(to, n);
        return n;
 }
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
 unsigned long
 copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned n)
 {
-       if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
+       if (access_ok(to, n))
                n = __copy_to_user(to, from, n);
        return n;
 }
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
 unsigned long
 copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned n)
 {
-       if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))
+       if (access_ok(from, n))
                n = __copy_from_user(to, from, n);
        else
                memset(to, 0, n);
diff -Nru a/xen/common/dom_mem_ops.c b/xen/common/dom_mem_ops.c
--- a/xen/common/dom_mem_ops.c  2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/common/dom_mem_ops.c  2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@
     struct pfn_info *page;
     unsigned long    i;
 
-    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, extent_list, 
-                                   nr_extents, sizeof(*extent_list))) )
+    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(extent_list, nr_extents,
+                                   sizeof(*extent_list))) )
         return start_extent;
 
     if ( (extent_order != 0) && !IS_CAPABLE_PHYSDEV(current->domain) )
@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@
     struct pfn_info *page;
     unsigned long    i, j, mpfn;
 
-    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(VERIFY_READ, extent_list, 
-                                   nr_extents, sizeof(*extent_list))) )
+    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(extent_list, nr_extents,
+                                   sizeof(*extent_list))) )
         return start_extent;
 
     for ( i = start_extent; i < nr_extents; i++ )
diff -Nru a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c  2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c  2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -812,13 +812,13 @@
     {
     case GNTTABOP_map_grant_ref:
         if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(
-            VERIFY_WRITE, uop, count, sizeof(gnttab_map_grant_ref_t))) )
+            uop, count, sizeof(gnttab_map_grant_ref_t))) )
             goto out;
         rc = gnttab_map_grant_ref((gnttab_map_grant_ref_t *)uop, count);
         break;
     case GNTTABOP_unmap_grant_ref:
         if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(
-            VERIFY_WRITE, uop, count, sizeof(gnttab_unmap_grant_ref_t))) )
+            uop, count, sizeof(gnttab_unmap_grant_ref_t))) )
             goto out;
         rc = gnttab_unmap_grant_ref((gnttab_unmap_grant_ref_t *)uop, count);
         break;
diff -Nru a/xen/common/multicall.c b/xen/common/multicall.c
--- a/xen/common/multicall.c    2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/common/multicall.c    2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -24,8 +24,7 @@
         return -EINVAL;
     }
 
-    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, call_list, 
-                                   nr_calls, sizeof(*call_list))) )
+    if ( unlikely(!array_access_ok(call_list, nr_calls, sizeof(*call_list))) )
     {
         DPRINTK("Bad memory range %p for %u*%u bytes.\n",
                 call_list, nr_calls, sizeof(*call_list));
diff -Nru a/xen/common/physdev.c b/xen/common/physdev.c
--- a/xen/common/physdev.c      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/common/physdev.c      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@
 
     case PHYSDEVOP_SET_IOBITMAP:
         ret = -EINVAL;
-        if ( !access_ok(VERIFY_READ, op.u.set_iobitmap.bitmap, IOBMP_BYTES) ||
+        if ( !access_ok(op.u.set_iobitmap.bitmap, IOBMP_BYTES) ||
              (op.u.set_iobitmap.nr_ports > 65536) )
             break;
         ret = 0;
diff -Nru a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_32/uaccess.h 
b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_32/uaccess.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_32/uaccess.h      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_32/uaccess.h      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -11,9 +11,6 @@
 
 #define __user
 
-#define VERIFY_READ 0
-#define VERIFY_WRITE 1
-
 /*
  * movsl can be slow when source and dest are not both 8-byte aligned
  */
@@ -39,10 +36,10 @@
                :"1" (addr),"g" ((int)(size)),"r" (HYPERVISOR_VIRT_START)); \
        flag; })
 
-#define access_ok(type,addr,size) (likely(__range_not_ok(addr,size) == 0))
+#define access_ok(addr,size) (likely(__range_not_ok(addr,size) == 0))
 
-#define array_access_ok(type,addr,count,size) \
-    (likely(count < (~0UL/size)) && access_ok(type,addr,count*size))
+#define array_access_ok(addr,count,size) \
+    (likely(count < (~0UL/size)) && access_ok(addr,count*size))
 
 extern long __get_user_bad(void);
 extern void __put_user_bad(void);
diff -Nru a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h 
b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h      2005-04-19 10:04:17 -04:00
@@ -12,9 +12,6 @@
 
 #define __user
 
-#define VERIFY_READ 0
-#define VERIFY_WRITE 1
-
 /*
  * Valid if in +ve half of 48-bit address space, or above Xen-reserved area.
  * This is also valid for range checks (addr, addr+size). As long as the
@@ -25,9 +22,9 @@
     (((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<48)) || \
      ((unsigned long)(addr) >= HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END))
 
-#define access_ok(type, addr, size) (__addr_ok(addr))
+#define access_ok(addr, size) (__addr_ok(addr))
 
-#define array_access_ok(type,addr,count,size) (__addr_ok(addr))
+#define array_access_ok(addr, count, size) (__addr_ok(addr))

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