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[Xen-bugs] [Bug 1368] New: [vt-d][MSI] some call traces printed to seria

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Subject: [Xen-bugs] [Bug 1368] New: [vt-d][MSI] some call traces printed to serial port
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Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2008 23:55:33 -0700
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           Summary: [vt-d][MSI] some call traces printed to serial port
           Product: Xen
           Version: unstable
          Platform: All
        OS/Version: All
            Status: NEW
          Severity: normal
          Priority: P1
         Component: Hypervisor
        AssignedTo: xen-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
        ReportedBy: haicheng.li@xxxxxxxxx

Service Arch (ia32/ia32e/IA64): ia32 ia32e
Guest Arch (ia32/ia32e/IA64):  ia32 ia32e
Guest OS Type (Linux/Windows):
Change Set: 18577
Hardware: Clovertown/Stocklay

Bug detailed description:
some call traces are printed to serial port when booting up guest with vt-d
device assigned (MSI interrupt),but guest can boot up normally.

detailed log can be found in attached xen log.

(XEN) [VT-D]iommu.c:1258:d0 domain_context_mapping:PCIe: bdf = 2:0.0
(XEN) Xen WARN at irq.c:517
(XEN) ----[ Xen-3.4-unstable  x86_64  debug=n  Not tainted ]----
(XEN) CPU:    0
(XEN) RIP:    e008:[<ffff828c8013ce7e>] pirq_guest_bind+0x2e/0x240
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010202   CONTEXT: hypervisor
(XEN) rax: 0000000000000001   rbx: ffff8300cf0f0080   rcx: 0000000000000000
(XEN) rdx: 0000000000000001   rsi: 0000000000000011   rdi: ffff8300ceff0080
(XEN) rbp: 0000000000000002   rsp: ffff828c80247c98   r8:  0000000000000011
(XEN) r9:  ffff8300cf0f0328   r10: 0000000000000008   r11: 0000000000000008
(XEN) r12: 0000000000000000   r13: ffff8300ceff0080   r14: 0000000000000011
(XEN) r15: 0000000000000001   cr0: 000000008005003b   cr4: 00000000000026b0
(XEN) cr3: 00000002161c8000   cr2: 00000000006f1064
(XEN) ds: 0000   es: 0000   fs: 0000   gs: 0000   ss: e010   cs: e008
(XEN) Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff828c80247c98:
(XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff828c80247e28 ffff828c8011b322 ffff8300cf0f0080
(XEN)    0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000006 0000000000000011
(XEN)    ffff8300cefe6080 ffff828c80125b5a ffff8300ceee8080 000000008014b5e0
(XEN)    0001000800000001 fffffffffffffff3 fffffffffffffffd 00007fffb6ec80f0
(XEN)    ffff828c80247e28 ffff828c80247e28 00000000004c3f38 ffff828c801317a4
(XEN)    0000000800000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 80000001eb712167
(XEN)    ffff828c801118f3 0000000080020000 0000000000000293 ffff828c8014fc35
(XEN)    0000000800000000 0000000080020000 0000000080020000 ffff828c80247f28
(XEN)    0000000000000cfd ffff828c80247e88 0000000000000000 ffff828c801541de
(XEN)    ffff83000000f800 fffffffffffffff3 00007fffb6ec80f0 0000000000305000
(XEN)    ffff828c80247e28 00000000ffffffda 00000000004c3f38 ffff828c80104cdb
(XEN)    ffff8300cefe6080 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000206
(XEN)    ffff810000003788 00000000000000c0 0000000500000026 00000000ffff0001
(XEN)    0000000000000011 0000060000000001 0000000000b12e30 0000000000b11ec0
(XEN)    0000000000b11690 00000000004c3f38 00002b01f3c12000 000000352e40cb03
(XEN)    0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000352e40cb03
(XEN)    00002b01f3c12f18 0000000000000006 00000000006f1340 000000352e4122e2
(XEN)    0000000000000000 0000000000000206 ffffffff8020a53c 0000000000000100
(XEN)    000000352ecca427 000000000000e033 0000000000000206 ffff8300cf02c080
(XEN)    00007fffb6ec8180 0000000000305000 0000000000000006 00000000ffffffda
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN)    [<ffff828c8013ce7e>] pirq_guest_bind+0x2e/0x240
(XEN)    [<ffff828c8011b322>] maybe_split+0x32/0x60
(XEN)    [<ffff828c80125b5a>] pt_irq_create_bind_vtd+0x23a/0x2a0
(XEN)    [<ffff828c801317a4>] arch_do_domctl+0xec4/0x1540
(XEN)    [<ffff828c801118f3>] rangeset_contains_range+0x23/0x50
(XEN)    [<ffff828c8014fc35>] guest_io_read+0xf5/0x180
(XEN)    [<ffff828c801541de>] do_general_protection+0x290e/0x2ae0
(XEN)    [<ffff828c80104cdb>] do_domctl+0xcdb/0xd80
(XEN)    [<ffff828c801a9169>] syscall_enter+0xa9/0xae

Reproduce steps:
1. boot up a guest supporting MSI interrupt
2. hotplug or static assign a device to the guest

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