xense-devel
RE: [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted ExecutionTech
To: |
"Keir Fraser" <Keir.Fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, <xense-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> |
Subject: |
RE: [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted ExecutionTechnology support |
From: |
"Cihula, Joseph" <joseph.cihula@xxxxxxxxx> |
Date: |
Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:09:09 -0700 |
Cc: |
"Xu, James" <james.xu@xxxxxxxxx>, "Wang, Shane" <shane.wang@xxxxxxxxx>, "Wei, Gang" <gang.wei@xxxxxxxxx> |
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Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:13:02 -0700 |
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[Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted ExecutionTechnology support |
Attached is a patch with a new Makefile (diff'ed from vanilla Xen) that
creates optional targets for tboot and uses the newly-posted release
(20071029) from SF. I have also added some text at the end of the
README file to describe Intel(R) TXT and tboot and how to build them
using the targets.
The new tboot release implements the 'tboot=0x1234' command line
interface described below for passing the physical address of the tboot
shared page to Xen. It includes a few other cleanups as well, as can be
seen in the changelog.
Joe
On Monday, October 29, 2007 12:27 PM, Cihula, Joseph wrote:
> On Monday, October 29, 2007 11:47 AM, Keir Fraser wrote:
>> On 29/10/07 18:34, "Cihula, Joseph" <joseph.cihula@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>>> Okay, we should limit the scan to page-aligned addresses in
UNUSABLE
>>>> regions below 1MB. It makes sense to put the UNUSABLE->RESERVED
hack in
>>>> Xen itself, rather than in tboot. Once the interface is baked into
3.2.0
>>>> it's not changing on our side.
>>>
>>> I'd like to allow for the shared page to be moved to a higher memory
>>> location in the future, so I'd prefer not to limit the search to
below
>>> 1MB. Since only tboot is using the UNUSABLE type and it should find
the
>>> shared page in the first UNUSABLE section anyway (whether it gets
moved
>>> or not), the search should still be quick. Also, I'll only change
the
>>> type from UNUSABLE->RESERVED if it is found in the lower 1MB.
>>
>> Actually I have a better idea to avoid the scan entirely. tboot
should
>> append 'tboot=<address of shared area>' to Xen's command line (e.g.,
>> tboot=0x71000). This gives a better more guaranteed handoff from
tboot to
>> Xen, it avoids the user needing to manually add any options to Xen's
command
>> line (we can make tboot= imply no-real-mode), and means that rather
than
>> doing a scan we simply need to confirm the UUID is at the given
address.
>>
>> I can easily do the Xen side of this if you agree it makes sense.
>
> Sounds good. I'll work up a patch for tboot and post a new tarball
> tonight.
>
> Joe
>
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xen-txt-cmdline-change.patch
Description: xen-txt-cmdline-change.patch
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- [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, (continued)
- [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- [Xense-devel] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Keir Fraser
- [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support, Cihula, Joseph
- RE: [Xense-devel] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Intel(R) Trusted ExecutionTechnology support,
Cihula, Joseph <=
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