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xense-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][ACM] kernel enforcement of vbd	policies	via	blkb
 
 
 Harry Butterworth <harry@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote on 07/27/2006 12:36:43 PM: 
 
> On Thu, 2006-07-27 at 17:26 +0100, Harry Butterworth wrote: 
>  
> > untrusted driver domain <-> trusted encryption domain <->
FE-domain 
> >                  
         hypervisor 
> >                  
 trusted access control domain 
>  
> Another argument in favour of this kind of approach is that if your
BE 
> is something like a fibrechannel driver for a SAN, there isn't actually 
> any security on the SAN side of it so any guarantees provided by the 
> driver domain are pretty much worthless. 
>  
> Harry. 
>  
 We are talking about scalable, secure, and efficient
local device virtualization. 
 
 The argumentation for network devices is very different
and also interesting. There is a whole new discussion about how to establish
trust into remote parties.
 
 Reiner_______________________________________________
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