Re: [Xen-users] Web Console Access

[Felix Kuperjans <felix@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Jonathan,

the Dom0 cannot be compromised as long as your SSH or web-based console does not have any security leaks.
PHP sessions are not as secure as SSH, but with SSL and suhosin patched PHP considerably OK.

As I said, I don't use web-based consoles so I can't help you there, but I'd *really* consider whether it is a good thing to setup a webserver on a Dom0 and it may be probably hard to do web-based consoles without that.

Regards,
Felix

P.S. Anyway, considering the method I posted, you should always setup GRUB and BIOS passwords for all of your Dom0s. I once requested KVM access at my provider and ended up at the wrong server...

Am 18.06.2010 15:03, schrieb Jonathan Tripathy:

Hi Felix,

 

I actually have that guy's book who wrote that article - The book of Xen - very good book indeed!

 

What I really wish to do, is provide a similar sort of thing to that SSH setup, except allow it to be accessed via a web browser. I have an idea where I can use ajaxterm and some PHP scripting. Once a user logs on with a username and password, I could tell php to start ajaxterm and piple xm console through it. This is what Slicehost does I think. The console would be protected with php sessions.

 

But my main worry was whether or not the Dom0 could be compramised via the above method, but I don't think that's the case.

 

Thanks

 

Jonathan

---

From: xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Felix Kuperjans
Sent: Fri 18/06/2010 13:50
To: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [Xen-users] Web Console Access

Hi Jonathan,

this is a common way to reset lost / forgotton root passwords:

You need:
- Physical access to a machine (if you want to reset the password of the Dom0 or a native linux) or console access to a DomU
- Access to the kernel command line, via lilo, grub or pygrub/pvgrub in XEN

Then you do:
- Modify the kernel command line, add the init=/bin/bash option, for example: kernel /linux-2.6.32.15-xen root=/dev/xvda2 init=/bin/bash
- You'll directly end up in a root console without password or any services started after the kernel booted
- enter those commands:
mount -o remount,rw /
passwd root
<enter new password>
exec /sbin/init

The root password will then be the newly set one.

DomUs generally are not vulnerable to this method, as long as the kernel command line is set in the domain configuration. But pygrub/pvgrub is a nice thing for hosting customers, because they can compile their own kernels, containing their preferred settings, modules and builtin functionality. Generally this problem is avoided by adding a password to grub, but some customers may forget that step.
So physical access can always be a strong weapon, but it is necessary for repairing a machine or for some advanced setups (especially when setting up a firewall, one easily gets locked out of the server...). I think the best way is securing this access, by restricting virtual console access to highly encrypted and authenticated sessions (IMHO the best way is SSH here).

I'd also think about customers forgetting to log out, because leaving xm console does *not* logout root inside the console.

The tutorial I posted to your I/O question contains a SSH-based setup for xm console access with sudo, which may be nice to start with. I personally use an own wrapper inside a chroot jail, to provide the ability of entering commands like create / rescue / setup (rescue starts another domain configuration with NFS root + rescue-Kernel, setup starts a virtual Debian setup). It's quite handy for VPS customers.

Regards,
Felix

Am 18.06.2010 14:26, schrieb Jonathan Tripathy:

 

Hi Felix,

 

Thanks for the email.

 

>a simple init=/bin/bash added to the kernel command line allows resetting the root password...
ok this worries me. Can you please explain this a little further? Do you need to have access to the Dom0 to begin with?

 

Thanks

---

From: xen-users-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Felix Kuperjans
Sent: Fri 18/06/2010 12:54
To: xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [Xen-users] Web Console Access

Hi Jonathan,

do you definitely need a web console (so really browser-based) or would you consider a SSH-based console?

I personally prefer SSH because it is more secure, easier to set up and it is somehow the default way of accessing remote consoles. You can do a modified SSH setup that only allows access to the console, or optionally, access to xm console, xm list, xm shutdown, xm create but restricted to the own VM of your customer. With chroot-jails etc., other commands cannot be executed.
SSH also has the advantage of good copy & paste of larger commands, and the possibility to work with multiple client certificates and / or passwords. Probably your administrative interface allows uploading of multiple public keys, so that your customers can have multiple adminsitrative accounts for the server (but only one can access the console at a time).

I've got no experiences with ajaxterm, but you should really control its security:
Console access is quite useful for hackers, e.g. some customer may forget to log out root or if you use pvgrub / pygrub, a simple init=/bin/bash added to the kernel command line allows resetting the root password...
So it must be a really secure application, not vulnerable to XSS, SQL Injections, Connection hijacking, ... and SSL encrypted.

Regards,
Felix Kuperjans

Am 18.06.2010 13:02, schrieb Jonathan Tripathy:

Hi Everyone,

 

Does anyone have any idea on how to give my customers a "web console" for their VMs?

 

Using http://antony.lesuisse.org/software/ajaxterm/ I can manually set up a remote session for them, by doing

ajaxterm.py -c xm console <DOMNAME>

However is there any way to make this automatic? Maybe I could put it in the vif script?

Thanks

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