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RE: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - VT-d (PCI passthro

To: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: RE: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - VT-d (PCI passthrough) MSI
From: "Cihula, Joseph" <joseph.cihula@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 24 May 2011 12:23:21 -0700
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Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx>
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Thread-topic: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - VT-d (PCI passthrough) MSI
> From: Ian Jackson [mailto:Ian.Jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 9:57 AM
> Cihula, Joseph writes ("RE: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - 
> VT-d (PCI
> passthrough) MSI"):
> > Why do you *need* IR to have a secure Xen w/ TXT?  Certainly a DoS is
> > very undesirable, but that is not really a security issue.
> I'm afraid that a DoS is very much a security issue.

Or a reliability/availability issue.  It clearly is not in the same class as 
security issues that allow for code injection, privilege escalation, etc.  You 
might even consider this as "fail secure" ;-)

> >  Tell me what security exploits are still possible with the current
> > patches.
> As I understand it, a DoS (host crash) is still possible.

So you would rather cause the DoS as soon as Xen is run (via the panic) instead 
of if a guest actually tries to use an MSI attack?  How does that make the 
system more secure?

So if we go back to another point I raised previously...  If you commit your 
patch, what will be your instructions (to users, etc.) for specifying the 
'iommu=' parameters?  I would expect they would be "If your system supports IR 
then specify 'iommu=force'.  If it supports IOMMU but not IR then specify 
'iommu=force,nointremap'." (unless of course you want to say "If it supports 
IOMMU but not IR then throw it away and buy a new one that supports IR or use 
KVM instead.").  Of course, the result is the same as the current 'iommu=force' 

> > If someone can present a security issue that TXT
> I don't understand the contribution of TXT to this.  The issue is with 
> running untrusted guest
> kernels.  Necessarily an untrusted guest kernel isn't checked by TXT; that's 
> what "untrusted guest
> kernel"
> means.

TXT does two things:  1) it prevents the SIPI attack (by turning it into a DoS) 
and 2) it prevents malware from tricking Xen into not enabling IR on a system 
that supports it.  The second one is what makes the current 'force' behavior 
the same on an IR system as your patch (i.e. panic/reset).

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