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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Simulates the MSIx table read operation

To: "Liu, Yuan B" <yuan.b.liu@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] Simulates the MSIx table read operation
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2010 11:01:48 -0400
Cc: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Dong, Eddie" <eddie.dong@xxxxxxxxx>
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On Wed, Aug 04, 2010 at 10:35:26AM +0800, Liu, Yuan B wrote:
> Hi,
>          This patch simulates the MSIx table read operation to avoid read 
> traffic caused by guest Linux kernel in a multiple guests environments 
> running with high interrupt rate workload.(We tested 24 guests with iperf by 
> 10Gb workload)
> 
> [Background]
>                    The assumptions about underlying hardware of OS running in 
> the virtual machine environment would not hold for some cases. This is 
> particularly perceived when considering the CPU virtualization that, the VCPU 
> of the OS would be scheduled out while physical CPU of OS would never be. 
> This cause the corner case trouble of OS designed inherently by the 
> assumption targeting the physical CPU. We have seen the _lock-holder 
> preemption_ case. Now SR-IOV issue is yet another one.
>          [Issue]
>                    Linux generic IRQ logic for edge interrupt, during the 
> 'Writing EOI' period, has been written the way that in a high rate interrupt 
> environment, the subsequent interrupt would cause the guest busy 
> masking/unmasking interrupt if the previous one isn't handled immediately(For 
> e.g. the guest is scheduled out).
> The mask/unmask operation would cause a read operation to flush the previous 
> PCI transactions to ensure the write is successful. This corner case isn't 
> handled by the Xen which only intercept the Guests' mask/unmask operation and 
> forward other requests(read/write table) to qemu.
>                  This special case doesn't appear in the light workload but 
> in the case of many (for e.g. 24) guests, it would cause the CPU utilization 
> of Dom0 up to 140%(This is proportional to the number of the guests), which 
> definitely limit the scalability and performance of virtualization technology.
>        [Effect]
>                  This patch emulates the read operation in the Xen and test 
> showed that all the abnormal MMIO read operation is eliminated completely 
> during iperf running in a heavy workload. The CPU utilization has been 
> dropped to 60% in my test.

I am having a hard time understanding this.  Is the issue here that
read/write of the MSI-X table is being done in QEMU, and it is much
better to do so in the hypervisor which traps already the mask/unmaks
operation so that QEMU is not overwhelmed by having to do this?

With this in patch in place, wouldn't QEMU still do the read operation?

> 
> Thanks,
> Yuan

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