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xen-devel
RE: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT
> From: xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ashish Bijlani
> Sent: 2007年10月26日 7:44
> To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT
> if I push xen's some addr (cs & eip) on the target guest os krnl stack when
> an interrupt occurs, would the guest os krnl return to xen
> immediately upon executing iret (as iret pops cs, eip from the krnl stack)?
> or would it make a vmexit coz of some illegal addr access
I assume you're only talking about Intel VMX guest. The answer is NO.
For instance, a VMX guest is running in "non-root mode"; it can only use its
(shadowed) page table; it can't use IRET to return to Xen that's running on
"root mode".
If you did that, what would happen is, i.e., a 32-bit protection-mode guest
uses its own GDT -- the guest may find the GDT entry indexed by Xen's CS is
invalid, so a #GP is generated in guest directly, and guest handles this (No
VMexit).
-- Dexuan
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- [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Ashish Bijlani
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- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Ashish Bijlani
- RE: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT,
Cui, Dexuan <=
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Ashish Bijlani
- RE: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Cui, Dexuan
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Ashish Bijlani
- RE: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Dong, Eddie
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Ashish Bijlani
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Mark Williamson
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Ashish Bijlani
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Mark Williamson
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Tim Deegan
- Re: [Xen-devel] Hypercalls in Intel-VT, Ashish Bijlani
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