arch/x86/mm.c:1897:    else if ( !IS_PRIV(d) )
In set_foreigndom. Policy is to allow operation on self, or else on the IO domain, or else by privileged domain. XSM hooks follow this for the individual mmu_update_ops, some of the individual mmuext_ops and in do_update_va_mapping.

arch/x86/mm.c:2831:    if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV(current->domain)) )
In do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain. Called immediately before call to set_foreigndom. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook is in do_update_va_mapping, but no attempt is made to check the domain.

arch/x86/mm.c:3018:        else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In arch_memory_op, XENMEM_add_to_physmap case. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/mm.c:3101:        else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In arch_memory_op, XENMEM_set_memory_map case. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/mm.c:3149:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In arch_memory_op, XENMEM_machine_memory_map case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c:890:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In hvmop_set_pci_intx_level. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c:937:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In hvmop_set_isa_irq_level. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c:984:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In hvmop_set_pci_link_route. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c:1033:        else if ( IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_hvm_op, HVMOP_{set,get}_param cases. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/traps.c:591:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In emulate_forced_invalid_op. Does not perform access control, but instead clears a bit in the EDX register (corresponding to Memory Type Range Registers.

arch/x86/platform_hypercall.c:39:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_platform_op. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hooks are placed in the individual platform_ops. 

arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c:912:         IS_PRIV(d) &&
In shadow_get_page_from_l1e. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. No associated XSM hook.

arch/x86/physdev.c:80:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_physdev_op, PHYSDEVOP_apic_read case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/physdev.c:97:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_physdev_op, PHYSDEVOP_apic_write case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/x86/physdev.c:114:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_physdev_op, PHYSDEVOP_alloc_irq_vector case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

arch/ia64/vmx/vmx_hypercall.c:50:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In hvmop_set_isa_irq_level. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/vmx/vmx_hypercall.c:82:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In hvmop_set_pci_intx_level. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/vmx/vmx_hypercall.c:127:        else if (IS_PRIV(current->domain)) {
In do_hvm_op, HVMOP_{set,get}_param cases. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/xen/hypercall.c:343:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_physdev_op, PHYSDEVOP_apic_read case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/xen/hypercall.c:357:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_physdev_op, PHYSDEVOP_apic_write case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/xen/hypercall.c:371:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_physdev_op, PHYSDEVOP_alloc_irq_vector case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/xen/hypercall.c:392:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_physdev_op, PHYSDEVOP_free_irq_vector case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/xen/mm.c:2075:        else if (!IS_PRIV(current->domain))
In arch_memory_op, XENMEM_add_to_physmap case. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. *No associated XSM hook.*

arch/ia64/xen/dom0_ops.c:35:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In arch_do_domctl. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. *No associated XSM hook.*

common/memory.c:235:    else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In translate_gpfn_list. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook is called for each mfn in the list.

common/memory.c:350:        rc = IS_PRIV(current->domain) ? -EINVAL : -EPERM;
In memory_exchange. Policy is to allow operation on *self only* (privilege is irrelevant). No associated XSM hook.

common/memory.c:545:        else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) ||
In do_memory_op, XENMEM_{{increase,decrease}_reservation,populate_physmap} cases. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/memory.c:599:        else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_memory_op, XENMEM_{{current,maximum}_reservation,maximum_gpfn} cases. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/kexec.c:361:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_kexec_op. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/grant_table.c:644:    else if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV(current->domain)) )
In gnttab_setup_table. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/grant_table.c:720:    else if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV(current->domain)) )
In gnttab_query_size. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/domctl.c:178:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_domctl. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hooks are placed in the individual domctls.

common/event_channel.c:116:    else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In evtchn_alloc_unbound. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/event_channel.c:624:    else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In evtchn_status. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/event_channel.c:781:    else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In evtchn_reset. Policy is to allow operation on self or else by privileged domain. XSM hook directly follows this check.

common/sysctl.c:35:    if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_sysctl. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hooks are placed in the individual sysctls.

common/schedule.c:453:        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
In do_sched_op, SCHEDOP_remote_shutdown case. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. XSM hook directly follows this check.

xsm/acm/acm_simple_type_enforcement_hooks.c:709:    if (!IS_PRIV(current->domain)) {
In ste_pre_grant_setup. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. No associated XSM hook.

xsm/acm/acm_ops.c:41:    return (IS_PRIV(d) ? 0 : -EPERM);
In acm_authorize_acm_ops. Policy is to allow operation by privileged domain only. No associated XSM hook.