I wrote to xen-users a few weeks ago about difficulty I was having
with the TCP checksum offload feature[1]. The xen-users list seems to
have a fair few people who are having difficulty with this
optimisation. In order to debug my problem, I ended up modifying the
Xen 3.0.1 network backend driver[2]. Since I'm suggesting a change to
the behaviour and default configuration, it seems appropriate to post
here:
Background:
Hardcoded in the Xen 3.0.1 network backend driver (in the supplied
patch to Linux 2.6.12) is the notion that packets `outbound' through
the network backend (destined for a frontend in another guest) do not
ever need to be checksummed.
I can't find any design documentation which explains this decision, but
I presume that this is the result of the following chain of reasoning
about virtual network interfaces:
1. The backend is in dom0 and the frontend is in some domU.
2. domU does not have and use any physical network hardware.
3. The domU does not act as a router-encapsulator. (eg,
run a VPN client, tunnel endpoint, etc. etc.)
4. The domU will always know correctly whether the packet
originated from dom0 (checksum not needed, not calculated) or from
some other machine and just came via domU (checksum calculated and
needed).
5. Therefore all packets leaving dom0 for domU will terminate
on that domU and do not need to be checksummed.
(It is possible that there's something fancy happening in the
frontend; I briefly looked at that code but didn't take the time to
understand it fully.)
All of the assumptions 1-4 can be false. 1-3 can be false in many
network topologies and the system should not assume that the network
topology is as set up by the provided default configuration scripts.
4 is apparently false in my case and caused the symptoms I saw.
While Xen allows the frontend interface's `transmit checksum offload'
(ie, for packets leaving that guest) to be enabled and disabled from
userland, so that checksum calculation can be suprresed, it does not
allow the `receive checksum offload' (for packets entering the guest)
to be controlled, and it does not allow the backend's checksum
processing to be enabled and disabled (in 3.0.1, at least).
Some observations:
In the general case, it is not possible to determine whether any
particular packet needs checksum processing (generation, outbound, or
checking, inbound) without knowledge of the network topology and
configuration. This network topology and configuration could be very
complex, as many of the guests supported by Xen have very
sophisticated (not to say dangerous!) mixed-layer packet routing and
mangling capabilities; additionally, Xen guests (including dom0 and
domU) may well contain instances of routers or encapsulators which
will further complicate the topology.
Therefore, it is not possible to encode rules for correct behaviour in
the code for Xen's virtual network devices. The correct behaviour can
only be determined by the network configuration scripts which are also
responsible for establishing the desired network topology.
Ie, the behaviour must be configurable from userland.
In many (most?) scenarios, checksums cannot safely be suppressed for
any significant proportion of the traffic. If the guests are strongly
isolated with their own filesystems and the purpose is providing
multiple largely-independent hardware platforms, guest-guest
communication will be relatively rare, and of course communications
from one guest to the internet at large must be checksummed. The
suppression is only useful when a large amount of network traffic has
the different guests as endpoints; the most likely scenario is one
where the guests share `network' filesystems from dom0 - but this is
not the default configuration with the supplied scripts, and doing it
safely involves significant effort to ensure that the fs traffic is
protected from interference.
Ie, the checksum offload should be disabled by default.
It's probably too hard to write sensible rules, or provide a sensible
mechanism, to allow different packets traversing the same interface to
be treated differently. The administrator will probably want to
control the checksumming via iptables rules, routing tables, or other
normal host-side mechanisms and Linux's packet-handling system is not
ideally suited for this AFAIAA.
So, I conclude that:
* Checksum suppression for virtual network backends should not be done
with NETIF_F_NO_CSUM but with NETIF_F_IP_CSUM or the like, as for
the frontends.
* Any code in the frontend that attempts to decide whether the
peer for a packet is the backend guest itself or some other machine
further away should be removed.
* Checksum suppression control with ethtool -K should be supported
both for outbound and inbound packets on both frontend and backend
devices.
* The default should have checksum suppression enabled.
* Ideally, there would be example scripts which provide guest domains
with a set of eth1's on a private entirely-virtual network, all of
whose interfaces have checksums suppressed, and which does not
exchange packets with the wider Internet. This could be used for
intra-system NFS, etc.
Thanks,
Ian.
[1] http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-users/2006-03/msg00135.html
and the subsequent thread.
[2] http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-users/2006-03/msg00159.html
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