# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
# Date 1304949977 -3600
# Node ID c2adc059e9311cc88778fd6020818344902ecdc6
# Parent e91977e7ab3ab097a49c6a4780b330a4f48dac81
libxc: [CVE-2011-1583] pv kernel image validation
The functions which interpret the kernel image supplied for a
paravirtualised guest, and decompress it into memory when booting the
domain, are incautious. Specifically:
(i) Integer overflow in the decompression loop memory allocator might
result in overrunning the buffer used for the decompressed image;
(ii) Integer overflows and lack of checking of certain length fields
can result in the loader reading its own address space beyond the
size of the supplied kernel image file.
(iii) Lack of error checking in the decompression loop can lead to an
infinite loop.
This patch fixes these problems.
CVE-2011-1583.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
diff -r e91977e7ab3a -r c2adc059e931 tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c Mon May 09 12:20:24 2011 +0100
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_bzimageloader.c Mon May 09 15:06:17 2011 +0100
@@ -68,8 +68,29 @@
for ( ; ; )
{
ret = BZ2_bzDecompress(&stream);
- if ( (stream.avail_out == 0) || (ret != BZ_OK) )
+ if ( ret == BZ_STREAM_END )
{
+ xc_dom_printf("BZIP2: Saw data stream end\n");
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ( ret != BZ_OK )
+ {
+ xc_dom_printf("BZIP2: error %d", ret);
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ( stream.avail_out == 0 )
+ {
+ /* Protect against output buffer overflow */
+ if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ {
+ xc_dom_printf("BZIP2: output buffer overflow\n");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
+ }
+
tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
{
@@ -83,16 +104,18 @@
stream.avail_out = (outsize * 2) - outsize;
outsize *= 2;
}
-
- if ( ret != BZ_OK )
+ else if ( stream.avail_in == 0 )
{
- if ( ret == BZ_STREAM_END )
- {
- xc_dom_printf("BZIP2: Saw data stream end\n");
- retval = 0;
- break;
- }
- xc_dom_printf("BZIP2: error\n");
+ /*
+ * If there is output buffer available then this indicates
+ * that BZ2_bzDecompress would like more input data to be
+ * provided. However our complete input buffer is in
+ * memory and provided upfront so if avail_in is zero this
+ * actually indicates a truncated input.
+ */
+ xc_dom_printf("BZIP2: not enough input\n");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto bzip2_cleanup;
}
}
@@ -187,31 +210,14 @@
for ( ; ; )
{
ret = lzma_code(&stream, action);
- if ( (stream.avail_out == 0) || (ret != LZMA_OK) )
+ if ( ret == LZMA_STREAM_END )
{
- tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
- if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
- {
- xc_dom_printf("LZMA: Failed to realloc memory\n");
- free(out_buf);
- goto lzma_cleanup;
- }
- out_buf = tmp_buf;
-
- stream.next_out = out_buf + outsize;
- stream.avail_out = (outsize * 2) - outsize;
- outsize *= 2;
+ xc_dom_printf("LZMA: Saw data stream end\n");
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
}
-
if ( ret != LZMA_OK )
{
- if ( ret == LZMA_STREAM_END )
- {
- xc_dom_printf("LZMA: Saw data stream end\n");
- retval = 0;
- break;
- }
-
switch ( ret )
{
case LZMA_MEM_ERROR:
@@ -245,7 +251,32 @@
}
xc_dom_printf("%s: LZMA decompression error %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, msg);
- break;
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ( stream.avail_out == 0 )
+ {
+ /* Protect against output buffer overflow */
+ if ( outsize > INT_MAX / 2 )
+ {
+ xc_dom_printf("LZMA: output buffer overflow\n");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf = realloc(out_buf, outsize * 2);
+ if ( tmp_buf == NULL )
+ {
+ xc_dom_printf("LZMA: Failed to realloc memory");
+ free(out_buf);
+ goto lzma_cleanup;
+ }
+ out_buf = tmp_buf;
+
+ stream.next_out = out_buf + outsize;
+ stream.avail_out = (outsize * 2) - outsize;
+ outsize *= 2;
}
}
@@ -314,18 +345,18 @@
extern struct xc_dom_loader elf_loader;
-static unsigned int payload_offset(struct setup_header *hdr)
+static int check_magic(struct xc_dom_image *dom, const void *magic, size_t len)
{
- unsigned int off;
+ if (len > dom->kernel_size)
+ return 0;
- off = (hdr->setup_sects + 1) * 512;
- off += hdr->payload_offset;
- return off;
+ return (memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, magic, len) == 0);
}
static int xc_dom_probe_bzimage_kernel(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
{
struct setup_header *hdr;
+ uint64_t payload_offset, payload_length;
int ret;
if ( dom->kernel_blob == NULL )
@@ -358,10 +389,30 @@
return -EINVAL;
}
- dom->kernel_blob = dom->kernel_blob + payload_offset(hdr);
- dom->kernel_size = hdr->payload_length;
- if ( memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, "\037\213", 2) == 0 )
+ /* upcast to 64 bits to avoid overflow */
+ /* setup_sects is u8 and so cannot overflow */
+ payload_offset = (hdr->setup_sects + 1) * 512;
+ payload_offset += hdr->payload_offset;
+ payload_length = hdr->payload_length;
+
+ if ( payload_offset >= dom->kernel_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(XC_INVALID_KERNEL, "%s: payload offset overflow",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if ( (payload_offset + payload_length) > dom->kernel_size )
+ {
+ xc_dom_panic(XC_INVALID_KERNEL, "%s: payload length overflow",
+ __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ dom->kernel_blob = dom->kernel_blob + payload_offset;
+ dom->kernel_size = payload_length;
+
+ if ( check_magic(dom, "\037\213", 2) )
{
ret = xc_dom_try_gunzip(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
if ( ret == -1 )
@@ -372,7 +423,7 @@
return -EINVAL;
}
}
- else if ( memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, "\102\132\150", 3) == 0 )
+ else if ( check_magic(dom, "\102\132\150", 3) )
{
ret = xc_try_bzip2_decode(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
if ( ret < 0 )
@@ -383,7 +434,7 @@
return -EINVAL;
}
}
- else if ( memcmp(dom->kernel_blob, "\135\000", 2) == 0 )
+ else if ( check_magic(dom, "\135\000", 2) )
{
ret = xc_try_lzma_decode(dom, &dom->kernel_blob, &dom->kernel_size);
if ( ret < 0 )
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